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Abstract 
This thesis provides a study on the support schemes for renewable electricity 
generation. In particular two schemes, namely Feed-in Tariff (FIT) and Tradable 
Green Certificate (TGC), are compared. The author analyzes the applications of the 
two schemes in the wind power markets of four different countries and takes a further 
look at the common certificate market that Norway and Sweden will enter in 2012. 
The country case studies reveal that the FIT system has advantages in stimulating new 
capacity, reducing risk and utilizing resources, while the TGC system ensures cost 
control and performs efficiently in meeting a policy goal within a limited time frame. 
The future Norwegian-Swedish common TGC market can help Norway to further 
utilize its hydropower resources and fulfill the international obligations. However, it 
should be aware that the technology-neutral design of the system may create windfall 
profit for lower-cost generators and thus lead to an allocation problem.  
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1. Introduction 
The development of renewable energy can enhance fuel security and provide 
environmental benefits. It is also regarded as the best solution to the challenge of 
climate change, an issue that has raised widespread public awareness at present. In the 
long term, renewable energy may become the dominant sources for world energy 
consumption, so many countries have long been putting strategic interests in fostering 
the early development of the markets. 
Cost remains the core issue in the diffusion of renewables. As most of the renewable 
sources are not economically viable so far and their social benefits cannot be properly 
internalized financially, any further development requires supportive frameworks 
provided by the policymakers. The design of the policy incentives in many cases can 
determine the extent to which a market can grow. A well-designed support scheme can 
reduce the investment risk of the developers, and at the same time control the subsidy 
cost at a reasonable level and encourage future cost reduction. Conversely, the whole 
renewable industries can stop functioning due to a poorly set regulatory framework. 
Support schemes to renewable industries can be generally divided as investment 
support and operating support (Cali et al, 2009). Investment support is defined as 
policies to facilitate the upfront investment of renewable projects. Examples of 
investment support includes capital grant, tax exemption, and so on. Operating 
support is more related to the operation of the projects and generation of electricity. It 
is often granted for every unit of renewable electricity generation. Compared to the 
investment support, operating support usually has more profound impact on the whole 
life of the project. This thesis aims at providing an international comparison of some 
existing operating support schemes.  
There are two main types of operating support in the world’s renewable industries 
today. The top 10 countries with highest wind capacity installed are all using either 
one of them to promote their domestic markets. The first method is the feed-in system, 
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sometimes also referred to as a pricing approach, in which a fixed amount of 
compensation is given to renewable generators for every unit of electricity they 
generate to balance the extra cost from using unconventional sources. The payment 
can be either a feed-in tariff (FIT) that is above the market price, or a premium paid 
additionally on top of the wholesale market price. The countries using feed-in systems 
include for instance Germany, Denmark, China, France and Spain. The second 
method is the tradable green certificate scheme (TGC), which is often called a quota 
approach, boosting renewable development through setting renewable mandates for 
retailers and requiring them to buy green certificates in proportion with the total 
amount of electricity delivered. Green certificates are granted to renewable generators 
and can be sold or traded afterwards, serving as an extra income for the generators. 
Examples of countries adopting a TGC scheme are the UK, Sweden, Italy (combined 
with a FIT) and many states in the US. 
There used to be other types of support mechanisms for renewable energy. For 
instance, the UK and China used to implement a tendering system. In such a system 
tenders are often invited to compete for a certain financial budget to construct a 
certain capacity of renewable generation. However, most of these systems are 
abandoned now and the pricing and quota approaches are the most common choices 
for regulators when considering new policies. 
The objective of this paper is to provide an international comparison on the 
effectiveness of the two mechanisms in promoting renewable energy. Four country 
cases are evaluated: Germany and Denmark are used as representatives for the pricing 
approach, and the US (represented by Texas) and the UK are examples of the quota 
approach. In most part of the paper, the author focuses the analysis on the wind power 
industry. The analysis on other sources is provided separately in a renewable diversity 
discussion. 
The reason for choosing wind as a main focus is its high maturity as an 
unconventional renewable source and some of its key characteristics that are shared 
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among many renewable sources, such as high capital input, low variable cost and long 
investment cycle. These characteristics have a deep implication on the design of the 
support policy. In addition, most of the countries have policy frameworks specially 
designed to promote wind power, offering a high degree of comparability. Not all the 
countries have policy incentives designed for other sources. 
Based on the international comparison this thesis summarizes the main characteristics 
of the FIT and TGC schemes. After that, an evaluation is made on the potential 
influence of a TGC scheme on the development of green electricity in Norway. In 
September 2009 Norway and Sweden announced an agreement to establish a common 
green certificate market from January 2012. The purpose of the agreement is to 
further promote green electricity generation, especially to exploit the wind resources 
in Norway. The implementation of the policy is expected to have a profound influence 
on the renewable industry. This thesis discusses this issue based on the characteristics 
and practical experiences of the support schemes. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 has a brief introduction of the 
economic mechanisms of the FIT and TGC；Chapter 3 elaborates on the economics of 
the wind power industry with a focus on the cost composition of the industry; Chapter 
4 is an international comparison of the utilization of operating support schemes in 
four markets: Germany, UK, Texas and Denmark; Chapter 5 builds upon the country 
cases in Chapter 4 and provides a discussion on the main characteristics of the FIT 
and TGC; Chapter 6 looks at the future joint green certificate market in Norway and 
Sweden and evaluates the suitability for Norway to enter such a system. Policy 
suggestions are raised for a better design of the green certificate market. A conclusion 
of the thesis is given in Chapter 7.  
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2. Introduction of the Mechanism of FIT and TGC 
This chapter gives a brief review on the theoretical background of the two support 
schemes, FIT and TGC. The discussion focuses on the mechanism of the two policies 
and how they can achieve the purpose of promoting renewable energy, as well as how 
they are affected by technological changes. 
2.1 Feed-in Tariff 
The feed-in tariff system is the traditional and most widely used mechanism to 
support green electricity. It requires the utility or the retailers to purchase the 
electricity produced by renewable generators at a tariff determined by the regulators. 
Renewable generation projects receive such a tariff for a long period, usually as long 
as 15 – 20 years. The tariff is set considerably higher than the price of wholesale 
electricity in order to compensate for the high cost of green electricity generation. In 
most systems the cost of paying the tariff will be socialized equally among the 
end-consumers of the country. 
Suppose the wholesale electricity price is P0 and at this price the quantity of green 
electricity developed is Q0. The feed-in tariff should be set at a level higher than the 
wholesale price, for instance Pa. In the long term investors are encouraged to develop 
new sites until the marginal cost of producing renewable electricity (including capital 
cost) reaches the tariff level Pa. The amount of promoted generation Qa is thus 
decided. 
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Figure 1: Feed-in System 
Ideally Qa should be equal to the resource potential of the subsidized area. The 
resource potential concept is price-related, that is to say, it refers to the resource that 
can be developed within a reasonable price. A too low tariff may be ineffective in 
exploiting the resource potential, while a too high tariff will result in promotion of 
poor quality resources and thus higher financial burdens on the electricity consumers. 
However, in practice the marginal cost curve of green electricity production and the 
resource potential are generally not known to the policymakers, so the design of a 
proper price must be based on proper estimates and a good knowledge of the cost 
structure of the industry, including both the capital cost and operating cost. 
In some feed-in systems, generators are not guaranteed the whole tariff, but only a 
premium above the wholesale market price P0. Generators will have to sell their 
electricity in the wholesale market, and therefore have more incentives to adjust 
themselves to the fluctuation of the market demand. The theoretical mechanism of 
this premium system can also be explained in the above graph, with (Pa – P0) equal to 
the premium level.  
2.2 Tradable Green Certificate 
The tradable green certificate system is another very popular type of scheme to 
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stimulate the penetration of green electricity. Under this scheme registered producers 
of green electricity receive a certificate for each unit of electricity produced from 
unconventional sources. They are responsible to market their own electricity, and 
usually only the electricity that is put on the grid can be entitled to green certificates. 
Green certificates can be sold or traded, which becomes a second source of income 
for the generators, an extra compensation for their generation of renewable electricity. 
In most of the systems the demand for certificates is from the retailers. The regulators 
design an obligatory quota for them, requiring them to supply a certain percentage of 
electricity from green sources. The compliance of the obligation is through submitting 
the required amount of green certificates, which can either be self produced by the 
utility, or obtained through the certificate market. Incompliance of the quota will be 
charged a penalty. A strict penalty system is an important factor for the effectiveness 
of the scheme. 
In a green certificate system, the market demand for green electricity is 
pre-determined by the regulators and the price will be determined by the market. This 
is exactly the opposite process to the feed-in system. In the following graph Q0 is the 
quantity of the green electricity which is already profitable before the introduction of 
the certificate system, and P0 is the price of wholesale electricity. The certificate 
system raised the market demand for green electricity from Q0 to Qa. Under a 
well-functioning penalty system, the quota will be met and the total remuneration for 
each unit of green electricity will be theoretically equal to the marginal cost of 
producing green electricity at this demand. The difference of the total remuneration 
and the wholesale electricity price is the theoretical price of the green certificates. 
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Figure 2: Tradable Green Certificate System 
The key question in designing a good green certificate system lies on a good estimate 
of the resource potential of the country. In the long term the development of the 
industry will be limited to the level of the mandated quota, because the extra 
development over the quota will not be able to receive any subsidy. Therefore, a too 
low quota may limit a country’s resource development. Conversely, if the quota is set 
too high, it will also lead to high incompliance rates. More expensive sites will be 
developed in order to meet the target, which imposes heavy financial burdens on the 
consumers. As the marginal cost curve of the industry and the resource potential of 
the country can hardly be accurately measured, a good estimate and a flexible 
adjustment system of the quota becomes a critical factor for the success of a TGC 
system. 
2.3 Impact of Technological Change 
When looking at the mechanisms of the FIT and TGC systems, it is also interesting to 
study the effects of the external factors. One of the key factors is the long-term 
technological change which is likely to happen in the renewable industry. As the 
support schemes are often guaranteed for a long period, the cost reduction brought by 
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technological change is a factor that cannot be ignored. FIT and TGC will experience 
different impacts from a technological change. Under a FIT system a technology 
improvement will bring in more green capacity installations, while under a TGC 
system it will lead to a reduction in the certificate price. 
A technological improvement will shift the marginal production cost curve of green 
electricity rightwards. Under a FIT as the tariff level is still fixed at P1, total output 
will increase from Q0 to Qa. Policymakers can either keep the output growing, or 
reduce the tariff level accordingly. Usually in a FIT system the tariff will decrease 
over time to adjust for the technological change. Under a TGC system the output will 
stay at Q0 which is the quota level, but the shift of the marginal production cost curve 
will bring down the certificate price from P1 to P2. Hence the cost of the TGC system 
will be reduced. The regulators can either keep the reduced quota cost at the same 
output or increase the quota in order to stimulate more development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Impacts of Technology Improvement on FIT and TGC 
The effects of technological change therefore show the different focus of the two 
systems. The FIT system has a higher focus on capacity growth, while the TGC 
system lays more emphasis on cost control.  
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3. Introduction to Wind Power Economics 
In this thesis the wind power industry is used as an example to look at the renewable 
support schemes of different nations. An elaboration on the economics of wind power 
is presented in this chapter for an introductory purpose. The discussion mainly 
focuses on the cost structure of the industry, which is the most relevant for the support 
policies to be discussed in the following chapters.  
Upfront investment cost is dominant in the cost composition of the industry. Capital 
cost accounts for as much as 80% of the total cost of a wind project over its lifespan, 
which is about 20 years. Capital cost includes the installation of the wind turbine (the 
turbine and foundation), as well as grid connection and other cost. Variable cost, 
mainly operation and maintenance cost, accounts for only about 20% in the total cost 
composition. 
The capital cost of a wind project has been increasing rapidly in recent years, after a 
steady reduction of more than two decades. The average installation cost in the US 
has increased to $ 2,120 /kW in 2009, which represents an increase of 63% compared 
to the level of 2003(Wiser and Bolinger, 2009). This increase of the installation cost 
has a substantial effect on the average generation cost of the wind-based electricity. It 
means that the projects installed in 2009 will be about 50% more costly than those 
installed several years ago. The reason for the significant cost increase is the growing 
prices of the raw materials used in the construction, such as steel, copper and 
aluminum. For instance, the copper price increased by over 200% from 2004 to 2008, 
while the aluminum price grew by more than 60% during the same period. The 
installation cost of wind projects is highly related to the commodity prices. The 
average installation cost in 2010 may become lower because the material prices came 
down in 2009, but it is expected to grow again with the recovery of the metal market.  
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Figure 4: Monthly Prices of Copper and Aluminum, 2000 – 2010 (US Dollars per 
Metric Ton) Source: indexmundi.com / commodities 
The grid connection is also a major cost component. The connection cost for the 
generators depends on the regulatory framework of different countries. In some 
countries it is partly or fully covered by the transmission network operators; in others 
the project developers have to be responsible for all the connection cost and possible 
cost of the upgrade of the grid.  
Blanco (2009) has conducted an estimate of the cost of the wind projects in Europe. 
According to his studies, the wind turbine accounts for about 71% of the total capital 
cost while grid connection contributes to about 12%. The other 17% is comprised of 
other capital cost. The same research has also estimated a variable cost (mainly O&M 
cost) of about €15 / MWh, which comprises about 10-20% of the total cost over the 
entire life of the project. In total the author measures the onshore wind cost at about 
€45–87 / MWh, but it is based on the average installation cost in 2007 at about €1250 
/ kW. In 2009 the installation cost has been 30% higher so the cost will also increase 
considerably. 
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The fact that the upfront investment cost is dominant in the cost structure has a 
profound implication for the industry. As a developer needs to pay 80% of the total 
investment when the wind farm is built, capital access and investment risk have 
become important issues for regulators when designing support policies. The feed-in 
system has advantages in stimulating investments. It offers a more stable subsidy and 
usually high repayment in the first several years. Germany is a good example in this 
aspect, which is discussed in the following chapter. Its FIT scheme lasts for 20 years 
and in the first 5 years a higher tariff is guaranteed. This provides an early 
compensation of the investment cost and a reduction of investment risk. The 
certificate price of the TGC is entirely determined by the market. If we take the 
capital cost into consideration and introduce a discount rate, the compensation from 
the certificate market in the late years of the project can only have symbolic effects. In 
this sense, the TGC system is not very favorable for high fixed cost technologies like 
wind power; technologies with higher variable cost may get more benefit from it.  
The quality of the wind resources is the most important factor that differentiates the 
generation cost of different sites. We evaluate the quality of wind resources by an 
indicator called capacity factor. The capacity factor is defined as the average power 
production of a wind plant, relative to rated installed capacity (TradeWind, 2009). For 
instance, if a power plant of 100MW generates 600 MWh of electricity a day, the 
capacity factor will be 25% (600/2400). Good wind resources can usually record a 
yearly average capacity factor of about 25%, while in some excellent resources it can 
be higher than 40%. In these good sites the annual output is much higher and average 
cost can be considerably lower. 
Offshore wind power is currently a bit more expensive than onshore wind. The wind 
turbine and foundation used in the sea have a higher cost, and it is costly to build 
transmission network to connect the offshore wind farm. The above-mentioned 
research estimates a cost range of €60 – 110 / MWh (Blanco, 2009). Currently there is 
only limited offshore wind development in the world, but in the long run it can be a 
promising area with more mature technology available. This thesis mainly focuses on 
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the discussion of onshore wind power because it is more comparable among the 
selected countries.   
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4. Country Case Studies 
In this chapter a study on the cases of four countries is presented with a focus on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the renewable support schemes adopted by the 
countries. The analysis uses the development of wind energy as a starting point to 
discuss several key aspects of the countries’ policies. An additional look on the 
promotion of other renewable energy sources is included in the diversity aspect at the 
end of each country analysis. The following aspects form the structure of the country 
analysis:     
 Capacity growth: the capacity growth is the most direct objective of most 
promotion systems. An overview of the diffusion of the wind capacity is given 
to explore whether the system has successfully fostered the growth;  
 Resource quality: the resource quality is an important factor of a country’s 
ability in developing its wind energy. It should be taken into consideration in 
order to evaluate whether the policy has well explored the resource potential of 
the country; 
 Target compliance: the extent of efforts in developing new capacity is highly 
influenced by the target set by the regulators. An examination of the countries’ 
target compliance can reveal the ability of the system in meeting the targets; 
 Price: the cost efficiency of the system in promoting renewable generations is a 
critical factor considered by the policymakers. A comparison of the additional 
cost incurred by using different systems can help to measure whether the cost of 
developing wind energy has become too high. 
 Risk: the level of risks that the renewable generators are exposed to depends 
crucially on the choice of the support systems. A system that reduces investment 
risks more effectively would be favored by the new investment 
decision-making.  
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 Diversity: an overview of the promotion policies on other renewable sources is 
provided to discuss whether the country’s system has aimed to promote a 
diversified renewable energy mix within the country. 
4.1 Germany 
Country Overview  
- Electricity Market 
Germany has an electricity generation mix consisting of about 60% from the 
conventional thermal power source (about 47% from coal and 13% from natural gas) 
and 40% from the emission-free sources. Nuclear source covers about 22%，wind 
power covers about 7% and biomass-based power contributes about 5%. The rest is 
mainly contributed by hydropower and solar power. 
The Germany’s wholesale electricity market is dominated by the bilateral 
over-the-counter trading. Besides, the European Energy Exchange (EEX), based in 
Leipzig, has been growing in recent years and about 20% of the electricity consumed 
in the EEX area is traded through this day-ahead market. There is not a balancing 
market in EEX. The major German grid operators buy these services at auction. 
Germany is currently using a uniform pricing structure. The transmission constraints 
are not explicitly reflected through economic signals. Some researchers have 
proposed a nodal pricing restructure to better handle the transmission bottleneck 
(Leuthold et al, 2008).  
The distributed generators in Germany only pay a shallow connection cost. A shallow 
charge means that the generators only need to pay the connection cost to the nearest 
network point. The costs of reinforcing the system beyond the connection assets are 
borne by the network operators and recovered through grid charges. (Oko-Institut, 
2004) 
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The German electricity market has a high degree of concentration. The four major 
companies control over 80% of the country’s generation capacity, which may lead to 
market power problems. Some researchers (Musgens, 2006; Schwarz et al, 2007, 
Weight and Hirschhausen, 2006) have quantified the market power existing in the 
German wholesale market and concluded that the degree of market power is high. 
- Resource Quality 
In Germany the average wind speed is at a relatively low level compared to the other 
countries that we discuss. In 2009 Germany recorded an industrial capacity factor of 
16.8%, which is close to the average level of the last five years. A comparison of the 
capacity factor among different countries is given in the following sections. 
Besides the reason of having a less favorable wind resource, the lower capacity factor 
in Germany may also be attributed to the stepped feature of the German FIT policy, 
which is elaborated in the rest of this chapter. The policy provides stimulus for the 
investments on the wind sites with less favorable wind conditions by guaranteeing a 
higher tariff. With those installations the average yield per MW capacity is hence 
reduced and leads to a lower capacity factor.  
- Capacity Growth  
The wind power generation has achieved steady growth in Germany during the last 
decade. The country has rapidly emerged as the leading wind power player in the EU 
countries in terms of installed capacity and power generation. The installed capacity 
has increased from about 4 GW in 2000 to 25.8 GW in 2009, making Germany the 
third place in the world only after the US and China. The wind generated electricity 
amounted to 38 TWh in 2009, a year in which the wind condition was below average, 
accounting for about 7% of the country’s total power consumption (GWEC, 2009).  
Scheme Mechanism 
The strong growth can be largely attributed to the carefully-designed feed-in tariff 
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system. Before 2000, wind power generators were remunerated by the Electricity 
Feed-in Act introduced in 1991. The Act guaranteed the mandatory access to the 
network for wind power, and required the grid operators to pay 80% of the average 
retail electricity price as a FIT, until the proportion of renewable generated electricity 
has reached 5% of the total supplied electricity by the utility. The policy was later 
under great debate due to its unbalanced impacts on the grid operators, because higher 
financial pressure was imposed on the operators in the regions with rich wind 
generations. Besides, as the FIT was related to the retail price, power generators had 
to face market fluctuation and some of them were not satisfied (Ragwitz and Huber, 
2005). 
In 2000 the Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien-Gesetz, EEG) was enacted 
to replace the former policy, and remains as the main support policy at present. 
Several changes have been made under EEG: 
 Feed-in tariff is no longer related to the market price but given as a fixed 
amount. 
 A FIT is guaranteed for each generator for 20 years.  
 The FIT is divided among all the grid operators and later socialized.  
 The 5% requirement of renewable shares is abolished.  
The following two key features in the design of the EEG scheme have a significant 
influence on the well-functioning of the system: a digression tariff structure and a 
site-differentiated tariff design. 
A digression tariff structure refers to a system in which the payments to the wind 
energy developers decline over time depending on the year of the beginning of the 
project. For instance, a project starting operation in year 2000 will receive an initial 
FIT higher than another one starting in 2001. The rate of decrease varies among 
technologies, with a faster rate of digression for more mature technologies. For wind 
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power, the remuneration started at €70/MWh in 2000 and decreased by 1.5% every 
year for the new installed capacity. The purpose of this digression tariff design is to 
provide incentives for cost reduction over time. The rate of digression has to well 
match the technology learning curve. In 2004 the starting tariff was increased to 
€87/MWh but the rate of digression was also increased to 2%. In the newly updated 
version of EEG 2009, the starting tariff for wind-based electricity was increased to 
€92/MWh to adjust for inflation and the rate of digression was reduced to 1%.  
Another important design is to make the FIT site-specific, which is often referred to 
as being “stepped” (Ragwitz and Huber, 2005). Under the 20 years time frame of the 
subsidy, the initial tariff is guaranteed for 5 years. This initial tariff is substantially 
higher than the reduced tariff which will be received in the rest years. The initial tariff 
is set higher in order to compensate for the high upfront cost in the investment stage. 
After the five years period, the wind power generators are evaluated by its average 
yield and the FIT for the rest 15 years is decided. A site with higher wind energy yield 
than a certain reference value will receive a reduced tariff in the following years. In 
the EEG 2004 this reduced tariff was set as €55/MWh. In contrast, the tariff to 
generators with a lower energy yield, which implies that the wind conditions are less 
advantageous, will remain at the high tariff for a longer period. The length of the 
extended period will depend on how windy the sites are (Mitchell et al, 2004).  
This site-differentiated design reflects the differences in resource quality, which has a 
strong implication to the behavior of the wind developers. The policy is particularly 
important in order to promote the sites with less favorable wind conditions, and it 
helps to maximize the utilization of the wind resources within the country. If this 
design is not included in the support scheme, all the wind developers will concentrate 
on those sites with the highest yield. The overall productivity will be increased and 
the average cost across the country will be reduced. Nevertheless, many potential 
wind sites will hence be wasted due to a lower profitability. Furthermore, an 
over-concentration of wind power on an area will lead to great challenges to the 
reliability of the regional network. In this sense, the stepped tariff design helps to 
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alleviate the pressure of the grid. 
In 2009, the reduced tariff for the sites with good wind conditions after five years 
operation was set as €50.2/MWh, which represented a 10% reduction from the 
reduced tariff determined in the EEG 2004. The following table summarizes the tariff 
levels in the three EEG schemes. 
Table 1: Tariff Level in the Three EEG Schemes in Germany 
 EEG 2000 EEG 2004 EEG 2009 
Initial Tariff €70/MWh €87/MWh €92/MWh 
Digression Rate 1.5% 2% 1% 
Reduced Tariff  €55/MWh €50.2/MWh 
Target Compliance 
One of the criteria to assess the success of a support scheme is whether the growth of 
the promoted energy source can reach the target set by the regulators. Germany has a 
long-term strategy for developing renewable energy, which can be reflected in the 
long time frame in the FIT setting – every generator is guaranteed a FIT for 20 years. 
The target share for the renewables in Germany’s electricity consumption was set as 
at least 12.5% in 2010 and at least 20% in 2020. The target in 2010 was already met 
in 2007, with the renewable-generated electricity taking up 15.1% of the total 
consumption and the wind power contributing to 7% (GWEC, 2007). The EEG did 
not specify a separate target for wind power capacity installations and electricity 
generation, but the strong growth of both aspects has shown the success of the policy 
in promoting the technology. 
Price 
The price of promoting wind energy is a crucial topic as all the cost will be socialized 
and borne by consumers. In a FIT scheme it is simply decided by the level of the FIT. 
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In Germany the compensation level for the wind power developers is €92/MWh for 
the initial five years for the projects built in 2009. The initial compensation level 
decreases by 1% each year for the projects developed later than 2009, until there is a 
new version of EEG released. For the last 15 years those sites with good wind 
conditions will receive a reduced tariff of €50.2/MWh while the other sites can 
receive the initial tariff for a relatively longer period to compensate for the 
disadvantages of the resources they are operating on. 
If we assume that a wind project has a similar yield every year, over the 20 years FIT 
period the average compensation for each MWh of electricity generated by a good 
wind site will be about €60 / MWh, given by the EEG 2009 level.1 The average price 
in the EEG 2004 is about €63 / MWh. If we consider from an investment perspective, 
we can calculate the net present value of the FIT compensations in each year and take 
an arithmetic average. In this way we will get the average NPV of the compensation 
for every MWh of wind power generation. This thesis aims at providing a rough 
comparison among the compensation levels of different systems, so here we do not 
discuss a specific discount rate for the German market. Instead a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted through assuming the discount rate at 5%, 6%, 7% and 8% respectively, 
which are the discounts rates that are normally used in the wind industry investment 
analysis. The result of the sensitivity analysis is shown as follows: 
Table 2: The Average NPV of the FIT Compensation at the EEG 2009 Standard 
Discount Rate 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Average NPV of 
the FIT per 
MWh over 20 
years 
€40.3/MWh €37.6/MWh €35.2/MWh €33/MWh 
                                                             
1
 Calculated through taking an average of the FIT over 20 years, with the FIT in the first five years at €92/MWh 
and in the last 15 years at €50.2/MWh.  
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A comparison on the prices between countries is provided in the later sections. 
Risk 
The inherent uncertainty of a support scheme is also an issue concerned by many 
wind developers. A stable investment environment with a long-term guaranteed 
compensation will greatly reduce the risk for the wind developers, who need to face a 
high upfront cost in project development.  
The EEG has a strong implication for the security of the wind power investments. A 
fixed tariff is guaranteed for a very long period, and all the electricity generated will 
have priority access to the grid. Under such a system the generators will not be 
involved any price or quantity risk. The price has no volatility, and all generated 
electricity can be sold at the same price even when the demand is low. The wind 
developers also do not need to consider any “quality risk”. The priority access policy 
protects them from the competition of the more reliable energy sources. 
In an investment climate with significantly lower risk, the risk premium required by 
the investors will be reduced. The reduced investment risk is one of the essential 
reasons for the rapid development of renewables in Germany. 
However, the priority access of wind power provides challenges to balance fluctuating 
power feed-in from this inherently variable power source, which is an important 
reason why the German regulators try to prevent an over-concentration of the projects 
in one region. The FIT system does not provide sufficient incentives for wind 
developers to provide reliable output or adjust quantity when the demand fluctuates. 
The plants have no awareness of the balancing of the system, which has brought 
negative effects of the integration of the generation to the grid (Mitchell et al, 2004). 
The extra balancing cost caused is transferred to the consumers, which increases the 
total consumer cost. 
Some improvements are needed in the current system to enhance the integration of the 
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wind-based electricity to the grid. One key issue is to match as much as possible the 
generation and distribution of wind energy to the actual demand. Some solutions have 
already been proposed by some researchers, such as charging a use of system (UoS) 
fee to the generators and differentiate the UoS charge according to the time of use and 
the connection voltage level. Less UoS should be charged at the production during the 
peak time and the connection directly at low voltage levels (Frias et al, 2009). If the 
country does not want to increase financial pressure to the generators (at present in 
Germany UoS is only to end users), the incentive can also be made as a form of extra 
bonus to those who adjust production according to the demand. 
Diversity 
Besides the promotion of wind energy, it is also interesting to take a brief look at 
whether the support scheme is designed to promote a diversity of a country’s energy 
mix. The EEG is designed for all kinds of renewable energy and the level of the 
feed-in tariff is depending on the cost of different technologies and resources. For 
instance, the small scale photovoltaic generators (<30 kW) receive €430/MWh in the 
EEG 2009, which is about seven times as much as the wind developers receive. As for 
the wind tariff, all the other tariff designs have the characteristics of being digressed 
and site-differentiated.  
The following table briefly summarizes the tariff level for the main sources of 
renewable energy. The differentiation of FITs by technologies is a critical factor 
contributing to the rapid development of various renewable sources in Germany. 
Germany is the leading photovoltaic market in the world, with the highest 
installations (6.5 GW) in 2009. The country also has the highest biogas power 
capacity in the world (3.6 GW) and the second highest proportion of biomass power 
(5.9 GW), only second to the United States. The state’s renewable energy strategy 
aims to achieve a diversified energy portfolio by utilizing all the available resources. 
The FIT system is essential to reach this goal. 
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Table 3: Tariff Level for Different Renewable Sources in EEG 2009(€/MWh) 
Sources Tariff 
Onshore Wind First 5 years Last 15 years 
 92 50.2 
Offshore Wind First 12 years 
130 
Last 8 years 
 35 
Biomass <0.15 MW 0.15 – 0.5 MW 0.5 – 5MW >5MW 
 116.7 91.8 82.9 77.9 
Small Hydro <0.5 MW 0.5 – 2MW 2 – 5MW 
 126.7 86.5 76.5 
Solar < 30 kW 30 – 100 kW 0.1 – 1 MW > 1MW 
 430.1 409.1 395.8 330 
4.2 United Kingdom 
Country Overview 
- Electricity Market 
The electricity generation in the UK relies still mainly on the conventional thermal 
sources, with coal taking up about 35% and natural gas about 42%. Nuclear 
generation contributes about 16%. Concerning the renewable sources, about 5% of the 
total generation is from hydropower, while the shares of the non-hydro renewable 
sources are rather limited.  
The UK’s wholesale market is organized by the BETTA, British Electricity Trading 
and Transmission Agreement. Under the BETTA the majority of electricity is traded 
bilaterally either OTC or through brokers between generators and retailers. There is 
not a central dispatch by the system operator; the generators self dispatch and trade on 
a voluntary basis. Imbalances between contract and physical positions are managed 
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through a short-term balancing market. The market participants submit bids in the 
balancing market and the cheapest bids are picked to balance the system. The 
participants causing the imbalance are held financially responsible. 
The BETTA market is based on a single-price structure. Only one “spot price” is 
determined in the balancing market, and congestion is therefore not explicitly priced. 
Instead, the country imposes a locational transmission network charge (which 
accounts for roughly 25% of the total network charge) on both the generators and the 
consumers to signal the importance of the location. (Frontier Economics, 2009). 
The power producers in the UK have to pay a shallowish charge to cover connection 
cost. A shallowish charge means that the generators need to pay for the cost of 
connecting the network to the nearest point and the proportional use of grid 
infrastructure reinforcements at the distribution level (Cali et al, 2009). 
In terms of the market structure, the largest electricity producer in the UK takes up a 
market share of about 15%. There are a few large producers of similar size, such as 
Npower (owned by RWE), PowerGen (owned by E.ON) and EDF. The regulator of 
the UK electricity market, Ofgem, is concerned that the UK market is vulnerable to 
abuse of market power (Ofgem, 2009), both when there are constraints on the 
transmission system or more generally at the time of system tightness. The Ofgem’s 
report shows that this vulnerability has increased over the past few years and is likely 
to increase further.  
- Resource Quality 
The UK in fact enjoys some of the windiest areas in Europe (REA, 2009). Compared 
to Germany, the wind resources in the UK are more favorable. The average wind 
speed is constantly higher and therefore generates a higher output. A short comparison 
of the capacity factor of the UK and Germany during 2002 and 2007 has been 
calculated in Table 4, from which it can be seen clearly that the capacity factor in the 
UK is considerably higher than in Germany. This can be attributed to the better wind 
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resources that the UK has, as well as the fact that Germany has been extending 
deployment to the wind sites with less favorable conditions because of the incentives 
provided by the stepped tariff design in the FIT scheme. The higher generation 
efficiency implies that the actual average generation cost is lower in the UK, in 
contrast to the situation that a higher total cost is brought by the Renewable 
Obligations Certificate scheme, which is discussed in the price section. 
Table 4: Capacity factors in the UK and Germany 2002-2007 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
The UK 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Germany 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.20 
Source: EU Energy in Figures 2010  
- Capacity Growth  
The United Kingdom is the eighth largest nation in terms of total installed wind 
capacity in the world in 2009. In Europe it ranks number five after Germany, Spain, 
Italy and France. Compared to the other big countries in Europe, the growth of 
renewable generated electricity in the UK is not very fast. In this section the data of 
Germany is used for a brief comparison with the UK. 
The total installed capacity in the UK increased by about 3.5 GW from 2002 to 2009. 
In the same period a new capacity of about 14 GW was built in Germany. Figure 1 
compares the growth of wind power capacity in the UK and Germany. In 2008 the 
onshore wind capacity in the UK generated about 5.8 TWh of electricity, contributing 
to 1.7% of the UK’s total electricity consumption (DECC, 2009). Considering the fact 
that the UK is host to some of the best wind resources in Europe, the nation should 
have a great potential to reach a higher penetration level (GWEC, 2009). 
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Figure 5: Total Installed Capacity in Germany and UK (2003-2009, MW) 
Scheme Mechanism 
In the UK, a tradable green certificate market was introduced in 2002 to promote 
renewable energy technologies. The new Renewable Obligations Certificate policy 
replaced the NFFO (Non-Fossil Fuels Obligation), which was a tendering system in 
effect since 1990. The ROC policy intended to create a market-based incentive to 
promote the growth of renewable energy while minimizing the cost transferred to the 
society.  
Under the ROC framework it is the retailers’ obligation to purchase a certain 
percentage of ROCs corresponding to a share of the total electricity delivered. The 
initial share in 2002 was set at 3% and the target was to raise it to 10.4% in 2010-2011. 
ROCs are purchased from the licensed renewable generators who get one ROC from 
every MWh of generation. The renewable certificates can be traded among the 
retailers. In the ROC system, the renewable generators are responsible to market the 
electricity generated. They thus have two income sources from their generation: the 
sale of the generated electricity and the sale of the ROCs. 
If the retailers do not fulfill their obligations through collecting enough ROCs, they 
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need to pay a buy-out fee for every MWh of electricity delivered until the target 
obligation share has been reached. The buy-out penalty in 2002 was decided as £30 / 
MWh and adjusted annually to inflation. All buy-out payments are redistributed 
among the retailers in proportion to the number of ROCs they have presented, so the 
buy-out penalty compensates those retailers who collect ROCs. The existence of the 
buy-out mechanism increases the complexity of the system. It is easy to understand 
that when the ROC market is oversupplied, the buy-out fee will act as a price ceiling; 
on the other hand, it serves as a price floor when the market is undersupplied. When 
the electricity generated from renewable sources cannot meet the demand of the 
retailers, the value of ROC will go above the £30 floor. This is because the buy-out 
penalty is finally recycled to the ones who present ROCs, which means buying the 
ROCs can bring an additional income. This additional income will therefore add to 
the £30 floor price and lead to a higher ROC value (Hartnell, 2003). 
A numerical example shows how the system works: 
The ROC target of 2007 is 6.7% and the actual generation of renewable electricity is 
5.1% of the total generated electricity. The buy-out price in 2007 is £33.24/MWh 
(REA, 2009) which will be the floor price. Since the RES electricity supply can only 
meet the demand by 76% (0.76 = 5.1/6.7), there is 24% of the quotas needed to be 
met by buy-out penalty and the total penalty submitted is £8/MWh (33.24 * 0.24 = 
7.97). When this penalty is recycled into the retailers who provide ROCs, by 
supplying one ROC a retailer will get £10.5/MWh back. (7.97/0.76 = 10.5) This 
recycled value will thus raise the value of the ROCs as well as the price, and therefore 
the price of ROC in theory will be £43.74/MWh if only 76% of the demand for 
certificates is met and the buy-out price is £33.24/MWh. This theoretical price will 
then be influenced by the market expectation and the actual trading process. 
Target Compliance 
The development of the UK renewable energy market is unsatisfactory after the 
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implementation of the ROC policy. Despite the fact that the wind resources in the UK 
are concluded to be more advantageous with higher average wind speed and more 
potential sites, the wind diffusion level is not very high.  
The ROC scheme is also not very effective in meeting the obligation target. The target 
set in 2003 was to reach 10.4% of the electricity generation from renewable sources in 
2010. Recent data shows that in 2007 the share is 5.1%, representing a limited 
increase from 2.7% in 2000. A discrepancy can be observed between the RO target 
and the actual share of generation over the years that the RO was implemented, as the 
following figure illustrates.  
 
Figure 6: RO Targets and the Actual Share of RES-Electricity 2003 – 2007 
The ineffective compliance of the target can possibly be attributed to two factors: 
 Flaws in the design of the RO system  
 High market entry barrier 
From the explanation of the pricing mechanism of the ROCs, it is clear that the price 
in the ROC market is determined by the difference of the supply and demand of 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
ROC
RES-E
  
33 
ROCs. Under the RO scheme the demand depends highly on the given target, which 
enables the renewable generators to influence the price. A higher shortfall of supply 
compared to the demand will lead to a higher price per unit, due to the existence of 
the buy-out penalty. The renewable generators are therefore better remunerated. 
However, if the obligation target is met, the ROC price will crash. Under such a 
mechanism, the existing renewable generators have incentives to keep the market 
undersupplied in order to maintain the ROC price.  
If the market entry barrier is small, this mechanism will not cause any problem. Even 
though the existing renewable generators can control the supply to get a higher profit, 
more producers will enter the market to meet the demand and reduce the price. 
However, this does not apply to the UK’s case. In the UK, more than 70% of the wind 
capacity is directly or indirectly owned by the four major electricity suppliers who 
provide electricity for the whole country (Toke, 2005). These suppliers, at the same 
time, are often the investors of new installations. They have both incentives and 
market power to protect the existing projects from the crash of ROC price. On the 
contrary, if the compliance is delayed, the wind generators can benefit from a higher 
ROC price, while the extra cost paid by the main retailers will be recovered by the 
recycled buy-out penalty. The total revenue of these retailers is increased. Under such 
a situation, it is unlikely that they will allow the target to be met. Instead, they will 
exert their influences on the market to create barriers to those independent generators 
which don’t belong to the main retailers.  
The entry barrier problem is further compounded by the fact that new market 
participants need to face a large upfront investment and high uncertainty caused by 
the RO scheme, which is elaborated in the risk section.  
Price 
In addition to keeping the market undersupplied, the flaw in the ROC mechanism also 
increases the cost of promoting renewable-generated electricity. The ROC scheme is 
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supposed to have advantages in bringing down renewable prices. The market-based 
design aims at triggering competition among the renewable generators and the overall 
objective is to minimize the social cost of adopting renewable technologies. A 
well-functioning green certificate market is expected to have lower cost than a FIT 
scheme which is considered not involving competition among the generators. 
However, the price development of the UK ROC market did not provide evidences 
that the cost of supporting renewable energy have been effectively reduced. The total 
cost for every MWh of wind-based electricity generated in the UK in 2003 were €96, 
consisting of both the electricity and the ROC prices. Here we can make a rough 
comparison with the FIT for wind power in Germany. In 2003 the FIT for the first five 
years’ generation of a project is €77/MWh, while the compensation after the first five 
years is even much lower. The FIT in Germany increased slightly in the following 
years, subject to the adjustment to inflation. At the same time, the average cost in the 
UK for wind-generated electricity stayed in a high level of above €100/MWh. In the 
period of January to July in 2009 the average cost of one megawatt wind-generated 
electricity was about €108, in which the cost of ROC was €61 and the electricity price 
paid to the generators was €47. In the same year the FIT in Germany for the initial 5 
years is €92/MWh. The high cost of compensating the renewable generators are due 
to the high price of ROC in the market, which can be again attributed to the supply 
and demand imbalance described above. The price of ROC will go up when the 
obligation target is not fulfilled because the buy-out penalty paid for incompliance 
will add to the basic value of the ROCs. Since the difference of the RO target and the 
actual RES electricity supply has been enlarged over the years after 2003, the price of 
ROCs has become higher and brought up the overall cost.  
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Figure 7: The Compensation Level for the Wind-based Electricity in UK and 
Germany
2
 2003-2009  (€/MWh) Source: EREF 2006, 2009 
Risk 
The ROC system has been criticized by many researchers for the higher risk it brings 
to the renewable generators (Mitchell et al, 2004; Rickerson and Grace, 2007; CEC, 
2005). There are mainly four types of risks existing in the ROC scheme: price risk, 
quality risk, quantity risk and regulatory risk.  
Under the ROC system, the revenue of the renewable generators will depend on the 
price volatility of both the electricity market and the green certificate market. A 
relatively high degree of fluctuation has also been observed in the UK ROC market 
during the last 8 years (NFPA, 2010). The 3-month average auction price of ROC has 
ranged from £38/MWh in 2005 to £53/MWh in 2009. The volatility of both markets 
will create higher price risk to the renewable generators than a simple FIT system. 
However, so far the problem of a high risk premium is still not obvious in the UK 
because the overall price level of ROC has been very high compared to the 
compensation level in other countries and will likely ensure the investments profitable. 
                                                             
2
 The Germany’s price is the tariff for the first five years of a project in the EEG systems. The average tariff over 
the project cycle should be even substantially lower. 
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The investment risk should be relatively low given such a high ROC price. However, 
in the future if the amount of wind projects invested becomes higher in the UK power 
market, the certificate price will be brought down and the price volatility may lead to 
high uncertainty to the wind developers.  
 Figure 8: Price Development in the UK ROC Market 2002-2010 (£/MWh) Source: 
NFPA, 3-month average auction price. 
The UK wind developers also need to face a high balancing risk under the RO scheme. 
In the UK the system operator balances the system. If in a certain hour the renewable 
generation from a renewable plant is either over or below the planned generation 
amount, the generator has to pay a penalty as a balancing cost.  
The quantity risks in both the power market and the ROC market are also not 
ignorable. In the power market, the generators may not be able to sell the electricity 
when the market demand is low; in the ROC market, old projects may not be able to 
sell all their ROCs because new projects may have a lower cost. 
The price, quantity and balancing risk is further compounded by the regulatory risk on 
the continuation of the RO target. If one RO target is met while there is not a new 
target released, the price of the ROC will drop significantly which can cause huge risk 
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for the wind developers. All the risks mentioned above will bring uncertainty in return 
on investments, which creates barriers for the new entrants. 
Diversity 
The ROC scheme implemented since 2002 did not differentiate compensations to 
different renewable technologies. Given a certain amount of electricity generated, a 
wind generator will receive the same amount of ROCs as a photovoltaic generator. 
This implies that the technology with cost advantage will be promoted first until the 
resource potential is fully developed. Even within one technology, a site with a higher 
resource quality will be developed in priority. Such design is consistent with the 
policy’s target of meeting the obligations with minimized social cost. However, 
technologies with higher cost receive little incentives through such system. In the UK, 
the deployment of relatively expensive sources remains low after the implementation 
of the ROC scheme. This is quite reasonable and reflects the country’s overall energy 
strategy.  
In 2009 this policy was changed in order to pursue a more diversified renewable 
energy mix. Different technologies receive different amounts of ROCs for every 
MWh of electricity generated. The table below briefly summarizes the support level. 
High cost technologies such as photovoltaic, will receive 2 ROCs for every MWh 
generation. However, this support level is still too low to make PV installations 
profitable in the UK despite of the current high ROC price.   
Table 5: Support Level for Different Renewable Sources in RO 2009 (ROC/MWh) 
 
Onshore 
Wind 
Offshore 
Wind 
Biomass 
Small 
Hydro 
Solar 
ROC 1  1.25  1.5 1 2 
Source: REA (2010) 
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Despite of the low penetration rate in the onshore wind market, the UK is particularly 
strong in the offshore wind market and is the leading country in the world, though the 
market itself is not very big (883 MW of installations in 2009). The UK enjoys a high 
abundance of offshore resources along its coastline and the average capacity factor is 
more than 35%. A combination of the onshore and offshore wind development may be 
the emphasis of the UK’s long-term renewable strategy.   
4.3 Texas 
Country Overview 
- Electricity Market 
The competitive part of the power market in Texas satisfies about 85% of the state’s 
electric load. It is administered by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), 
a non-for-profit Independent System Operator (ISO) established to facilitate the 
efficient use of the electric transmission system for all market participants. There are 
more than 500 market participants acting different roles in the value chain of the 
Texas wholesale market.  
In 2009 76% of the total generation is from conventional sources. (36% is from coal 
and 40% is from natural gas.) Concerning the emission-free sources, nuclear power 
contributes about 15% while wind power has a share of about 7%.  
The market structure in Texas was designed to permit an extensive reliance upon 
bilateral contracts between generators and retailers to reduce consumer exposure to 
hour-to-hour fluctuation in electricity prices. The ERCOT does not operate a 
centralized market for power, but instead operate a market for balancing services 
which has a similar role as a spot market and covers about 5% of the Texas’ electricity 
generation. It also administers day–ahead ancillary services. The Texas regulator 
imposes price caps in the balancing market and ancillary services to avoid local 
market power abuses. 
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Texas’ shared network is open access and connecting parties only need to pay shallow 
connection charges (Baldick, R and Niu, H, 2008).  
Before December, 2010 Texas used a zonal congestion management system. Five 
congestion zones were established to facilitate the use of the transmission system 
during periods of binding transmission capacity constraints. All the market 
participants were required to submit their energy schedules to the ERCOT. Every 15 
minutes the ERCOT compared the sum of the schedules and its own forecast, and 
provided balancing and ancillary services. If the submitted schedule resulted in 
network congestion, the ERCOT would re-dispatch resources (Baldick, R and Niu, H, 
2003). The Inter-zonal congestion cost was directly assigned to those who cause 
congestion. On the contrary, the intra-zonal congestion cost was allocated among all 
the market participants on a load-ratio share basis.  
In order to better assign congestion costs to responsible entities, for a long period the 
Texas authority has been considering shifting from the zonal design to a nodal design 
(SUEZ, 2005). In December, 2010 a nodal market is formally implemented in order to 
facilitate more efficient dispatch and cost allocation across the ERCOT.  
Preventing market power abuse is an important task for the Texas regulators. In order 
to dilute market power, no generator is permitted to control more than 20% of the 
installed capacity in the ERCOT. But Texas still has relatively high degree of market 
concentration (the market leader in each zone has a market share of about 50%), 
though there has not been conclusive evidence that any market participants have 
abused their market power (Adib and Zarnikau, 2006). 
- Resource Quality 
There are abundant wind resources in West Texas. The average wind speed can reach 
8 m/s and some wind developers report a capacity factor of 35% or more. The 
generation cost in some plants can be less than $30/MWh, which is almost 
economically comparable with natural gas. The average wind capacity factor in Texas 
  
40 
is around 23%, a level quite similar to the UK. The actual resource quality may be 
even better than is reflected by the capacity factor. Due to the transmission constraints, 
generation from some sites have to be curtailed, lowering the overall capacity factor 
(CEE, 2009). The excellent resource quality is the essential factor for the rapid 
deployment of wind capacity in Texas.  
- Capacity Growth 
The United States has the largest installed wind capacity in the world. In 2009 there 
was nearly 10 GW of new capacity added and the total capacity reached 35 GW. 
Wind-generated electricity covers about 2% of the country’s total electricity demand 
in 2009. In the US the tradable green certificate market is the most popular 
mechanism to promote renewable energy. However, there is not a federal green 
certificate system so far. The states establish their own TGC schemes. The TGC in the 
US is often referred as RPS, Renewable Portfolio Standards. Mandatory RPS policies 
have been created in 29 states and Washington D.C. in 2009 (Wiser et al, 2008). 
Due to the fact that the RPS policies in the US vary from state to state, in this paper 
Texas is chosen as an example to discuss the RPS application in the US. Texas is 
considered by many researches as one of the most successful examples of promoting 
renewable energy growth through an RPS system (Wiser et al, 2004; Langniss and 
Wiser, 2003). The conclusion is made based on the tremendous growth of the installed 
capacity of renewable generation, especially the wind energy capacity after the 
implementation of the state’s RPS scheme. Texas enjoys outstanding wind resources 
and most of its renewable generation comes from wind. In 2009 a new capacity of 
2292 MW was added and the state is leading in the United States by running a total 
capacity of 9410 MW. The total electricity generated by wind is 20.6 TWh, 
representing about 6.9% of the total consumption in the state (ERCOT, 2009). 
Scheme Mechanism 
Texas is one of the first states to enact an RPS in the US. The operation of the Texas 
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certificate market shares many characteristics with the UK ROC market. The scheme 
covers all the retailers in the competitive market in Texas, which constitutes about 80% 
of total Texas load. The retailers need to fulfill the RPS requirement by presenting the 
mandatory quantity of Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) every year. The 
renewable generators obtain one REC by generating one MWh of electricity. Similar 
to the UK system, their revenue stream will come from the sale of both the electricity 
and the RECs.  
The required target of the Texas RPS, different from the ROC in the UK, is described 
in term of the installed capacity instead of the share of RES-E in total electricity 
generation. The targeted installed capacity is translated into required electricity 
generation by regulators every year to set requirements for retailers. The retailers are 
required to collect RECs in accordance to their share of the state’s total electricity 
sales. The RECs can be traded among generators and retailers and surplus of RECs 
can be banked for maximum three years. With regard to the penalty for incompliance, 
it is set as the lesser of $50/MWh or 200% of mean REC trade value in the 
compliance period for each missing certificate. $50/MWh thus acts as a cost cap for 
the compliance. （Langniss and Wiser, 2003） 
The Texas scheme does not include a mechanism like the buy-out penalty in the UK 
to recycle the penalties back to the retailers. Also, it does not provide priority access 
for the renewable generators. The wind sites need to compete with the traditional 
generation facilities in order to get dispatched. 
It is important to mention that in addition to the RPS scheme, the Texas wind 
generators are entitled to another important supportive policy, but from a federal level. 
It is the production tax credit (PTC) offered by the federal government and eligible in 
all US states. The PTC is a per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity generated by 
qualified energy resources and sold by the taxpayer during the taxable year. The latest 
PTC, approved by the bill signed in 2009, provides $21/MWh benefit for the first ten 
years of a wind plant’s operation (UCC, 2009). For the generators the PTC works like 
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a fixed premium. The existence of the PTC has a high influence on the mechanism of 
the RRS system. Suppose the REC quota is set at Qa. Originally the price of the 
certificate will be theoretically equal to the difference of P1 and O (wholesale 
electricity price). When the generators are guaranteed a premium A (equal to the 
difference of P1 and P2), the price of the certificate will be reduced by A and equal to 
the difference of P2 and O. The larger the premium is, the lower the certificate price 
will become. The theoretical output will still stay at Qa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Interaction of the RPS system with the PTC 
In some extreme cases, if the premium level is high enough to make the wind 
generation economically viable, the installed capacity will surpass Qa and the price of 
the certificates will become zero. If the regulators want to make the market continue 
working, they can raise the quota to a higher level in order to get the equilibrium at a 
point where the marginal cost is higher than the total compensation (wholesale price 
plus premium).   
Target Compliance 
Texas has experienced significant growth of wind energy which far exceeds the goal 
set by the Texas RPS. The scheme was established in 1999 and the initial requirement 
was in Texas Senate Bill 7 to build 2000 MW of new renewable capacity by the end 
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of 2009. This goal was easily achieved in 2005, four years prior to the deadline 
stipulated in the bill. The quick compliance of the goal can be attributed to the 
outstanding resources in Texas and the impact of PTC. In contrast to this, the initial 
goal seemed to be a bit conservative. The required 2000 MW capacity by the RPS 
scheme, in addition to the 880 MW renewable capacity that Texas already had before 
1999, can only satisfy approximately 2% of the electricity consumption of the state in 
2009.  
The early over compliance of the RPS scheme led to an updated requirement, Texas 
Senate Bill 20 in 2005, which asked for an expansion of the state’s renewable capacity 
to 5880 MW by 2015. Nevertheless, the updated requirement could hardly be 
considered as being more ambitious. A capacity of 5880 MW can only generate 
electricity representing about 3.6% of the total consumption given the 2009 level, not 
to mention the consumption growth until 2015. The relatively conservative goal is 
incompatible to the rich resources that Texas has, compared to the estimate by the US 
Department of Energy that 20% of the US electricity can be provided by wind in 2030. 
Even compared to other states in the US, the 2015 goal of Texas is quite conservative. 
California, for instance, requires at least 20% share of the total electricity 
consumption to be satisfied by renewable sources by 2010 (Bushnell et al, 2007). 
The market has acted much more aggressively than the regulators. The goal in 2015 
was surpassed in 2008 when the total installed wind capacity reached 7112 MW. The 
Senate Bill 20 also designed an ultimate goal in 2025 to reach 10,000 MW of capacity 
but did not stipulate any punishment for incompliance. However, this ultimate goal 
can generate only 6% of the consumption at a 2009 level, and it will also be met as 
early as in 2010, 15 years prior to the regulator’s projection, provided that the 
installed wind capacity has reached 9410 MW at the end of 2009 (AWEA, 2009). 
Figure 5 demonstrates the high degree of discrepancy between the actual growth and 
the two RPS required quota schemes. 
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Figure 10: Actual Installed Wind Capacity and Requirement by RPS 2003-2009 (MW) 
Source: AWEA (2009), Texas Senate Bill 7 (1999), Senate Bill 20 (2005) 
The conservative objective has also created transmission constraints in utilizing the 
existing wind capacity. Most of the new wind capacity concentrates in West Texas 
where the wind resources are most productive. However, the utilization of this 
capacity is curtailed by the development of the transmission capacity. Due to a 
conservative goal-setting, the long-term planning of transmission capacity 
construction cannot satisfy the rapid development of wind capacity. The transmission 
constraints limit the utilization of the new capacity, and the high penetration of wind 
power also challenges the reliability of the current network. According to a survey 
done by University of Texas at Austin among the wind project developers，93% of the 
survey participants considered the timely expansion of transmission capacity to 
accommodate wind potentials in West Texas as the most important issue in promoting 
renewable energy in Texas. (CEE, 2009). The limited transmission capacity places the 
wind developers in a difficult situation. In Texas it can be occasionally found that 
wind power is sold at negative prices: in order to get dispatched to collect 
remuneration from the PTC, some wind developers have to submit negative bids in 
certain hours  
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Price 
The average wholesale price of electricity in Texas is relatively high over the recent 
years at about $70-80/MWh (about €51-58/MWh). The high price is due to the high 
cost of natural gas, which constitutes 40% of the state’s electricity generation (CEE, 
2009).   
The wind power capacity deployment in Texas has achieved significant progress; 
however, when reviewing the price development of the REC market, it can be found 
that the capacity growth is not due to the REC market. The claim that the Texas RPS 
scheme has stimulated the state’s large-scale wind power market development is 
actually misleading. 
After fluctuating between $10 – 12 for a couple of years after 2003-2005, the price of 
the RECs has been in the downward trend since the first REC quota was met in 2005. 
During this period the federal PTC was the main factor that was driving the market. 
The growth of the installed wind capacity tends to rise and fall with the renewal or 
expiration of the PTC. According to the investigation done by CEE (2009), PTC has 
been the single most important factor for the market participants when making 
investment decisions. 86% of the wind generators considered PTC as very important. 
In the same research only 21% of the generators considered the certificate price as a 
very important factor. 
The market went to clash in 2008 when the second quota in 2015 was met 8 years in 
advance and no further goal was stipulated. In 2009 every MWh of electricity 
generated by wind power can only obtain a subsidy of $1.25 for selling a REC. With 
such a price the RPS scheme is no longer considered a factor in investment decision. 
The authorities did not propose any update of the quota, which to some extent showed 
that the regulator gave up the RPS as a means of promoting renewable energy and 
solely relied on the PTC. The REC price is not likely to go up unless a more 
ambitious requirement is raised in the near future. 
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Figure 11: The Development of Texas REC Price 2003-2009 $/MWh 
Source: 2008 Wind Technologies Report. Data comes from Evolution Markets and 
Spectron 
In 2009 the installed wind capacity in Texas continued to grow despite of the collapse 
of the REC market. The PTC has become the only instrument to fuel its growth. The 
current PTC approved in 2009 is $21/MWh, about 20 times of the level offered by the 
REC market. This level is enough to make the wind projects profitable given the 
current scale of the industry. It will be valid until 2012, and whether the wind energy 
generation will continue to grow will largely depend on the extension of the PTC. 
Despite the existence of the PTC, Texas does not have a policy to guarantee a 
long-term investment support, which makes it difficult to sustain the development at a 
stable level.  
On one hand, the Texas market has achieved the goal of the policymakers, as the 
targets set by them were easily passed. On the other, the Texas certificate market 
cannot be considered as a successful example of using a TGC scheme to stimulate a 
large amount of renewable generation. The targets set by the regulators are 
conservative compared to the development level in Texas today. The RPS scheme 
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only partly contributes to the fulfillment of these two goals (together with the PTC), 
while most of the market development after 2007 has to be attributed to the PTC 
policy instead of the certificate market.  
A counterargument to the ineffectiveness of the REC market might address that the 
Texas wind market has achieved rapid development and low price at the same time. 
Researchers holding this opinion may attribute the low price to the competitiveness 
brought by the REC market. This argument simply neglects the fact that the collapse 
of the market is primarily due to the introduction of PTC, instead of a real decrease in 
wind generation cost. A well-functioning tradable certificate scheme should stimulate 
competition among the wind generators which reduces the generation cost and the 
price of certificates. In the Texas case this does not happen. The wind generation cost 
remains more or less the same, but instead is covered by the PTC policy offered by 
the state. Therefore it is not appropriate to exaggerate the effectiveness of the Texas 
REC market.   
Risk 
In a tradable certificate scheme the price uncertainty inherent in both the electricity 
and certificate market is often one of the essential factors that hinder the capacity 
deployment. In the early development of the Texas REC market this problem was 
alleviated by the emergence of long-term contract. Obligated retailers were willing to 
enter long-term contracts (10-25 years) with wind generators for both the RECs and 
the associated electricity in the early years of the RPS implementation (Langniss and 
Wiser, 2003). The long-term contract provides a possibility for the wind projects to 
receive stable revenue streams for a certain period, and therefore plays a similar role 
as the FIT system in Germany to reduce investment risk. The only difference is that it 
is achieved by a market-based mechanism instead of a regulatory intervention.  
However, as the REC price has clashed and the current support level from the 
certificate market is low, it becomes more difficult for the wind developers to enter a 
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long-term contract with a price appropriately reflecting the cost. Without long-term 
contracts as a means to reduce uncertainty, the new entrants have to face a significant 
risk in price volatility. The problem is further compounded by the uncertainty about 
the extension of the federal PTC, which will be decided in 2012. The development of 
wind will not be able to sustain if there is not a renewal of PTC.  
Diversity 
Before the Senate Bill 20 in 2005, the PRS in Texas did not aim to promote a 
diversified energy mix. All the renewable sources can be used to fulfill the REC 
requirement. As a result, wind has emerged as the dominant technology, accounting 
for 98.5% of the renewable generation. In the SB 20, a target for “non-wind” 
technologies for Texas was raised to achieve 500 MW by 2015. The 500 MW 
“non-wind” target also does not differentiate between technologies, so the 
development will still concentrate on the lowest-cost technology. However, the target 
is still non-binding so far and there is no penalty for non-compliance. The goal of 
500MW by 2015 can only represent 5% of the capacity of wind power in 2009, which 
can hardly have any significant effects on the Texan energy portfolio.  
4.4 Denmark 
Country Overview 
- Electricity Market 
Denmark has 30% of its total electricity production from renewable sources: wind 
power contributes to about 20% and biomass-based power shares about 10%. 
Conventional sources take up 70% of the generation mix. The country has 50% of its 
generation relying on coal-powered plants and about 20% from gas-fired plants. 
Western Denmark and Eastern Denmark joined Nord Pool, the Nordic common power 
market, in 1999 and 2000 respectively. The physical trading in Nord Pool currently 
covers more than 75% of the electricity consumption in Norway, Sweden, Denmark 
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and Finland. Nord Pool organizes three distinct markets: a physical spot market 
Elspot, as well as a financial derivative market Eltermin for risk management and 
speculation and a balancing market Elbas. Besides Eltermin, the market participants 
can also OTC contract bilaterally. 
Elspot is a day-ahead market for physical delivery of electricity. Hourly demand and 
supply bids are submitted for the next 24 hours and aggregated to generate a system 
price (clearing price). All electricity is traded at the system price when there are no 
transmission constraints. 
Transmission constraints are handled differently in the Nord Pool countries. In 
Denmark a zonal pricing method is used. The market is divided into West Denmark 
and East Denmark with different clearing prices. The renewable generators in 
Denmark pay a shallow connection charge when connecting to the transmission grid. 
The concentration ratio in the Nordic level is quite low, but on a national level it is 
much higher. In Denmark there are two main generation companies respectively in the 
two zones. However, researches (Fridolfsson and Tangeras, 2008) show that the 
Nordic market is fairly close to competitive and there is no clear evidence for market 
power abuse.  
- Resource Quality 
Denmark also enjoys very high quality of wind resources. The national annual 
average wind speed is about 6 m/s, and in the North and West parts it is possible to 
observe strong winds at above 10 m/s in more than 150 days of a year. The capacity 
factor of Denmark has been staying at about 25% in recent years. It is considerably 
higher than the years around 2000 when the capacity factor was about 20%. The 
reason for the increase is that Denmark started to export wind-generated electricity to 
neighboring countries. In previous years the generation was limited by the 
transmission constraints and the wind farms could not work at a maximum capacity. 
As excess wind-based electricity began to be traded, more generation capacity could 
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be utilized and thus raised the capacity factor.  
- Capacity Growth  
Denmark is among the first movers of wind energy and wind power has played a 
crucial role in its energy mix. The country has experienced some ups and downs in the 
history of wind development. As early as in 2000, it had already built more than 70% 
of its total capacity today. However, the wind power industry had almost no growth 
from 2003 to 2008 due to an insufficient subsidy level. The growth was recollected in 
2009, and by the end of the year a capacity of 3, 465 MW has been installed in total. 
This represents the 10
th
 highest installed capacity in the world. All over the world, 
Denmark is the country where wind is most widely used. Wind-generated electricity 
constitutes 20% of its electricity demand while there is also a remarkable amount 
exported to the neighboring countries (GWEC, 2009). 
Scheme Mechanism  
The development of wind power in Denmark can well reflect the importance of the 
support scheme. A Feed-in Tariff system was introduced in 1993 as a stimulus for 
wind’s spread in the country. All the wind developers were guaranteed priority access 
into the network, as well as a FIT from the utilities equal to 85% of the price paid by 
the end consumers. As the market was not liberated at that time, the electricity price 
was relatively stable and the compensation level of the FIT was about €80/MWh 
(Munksgaard and Morthost, 2008). The FIT was a great boost for the wind industry, 
which helped Denmark to become one of the leading countries in this field in the 
world. 
During the years around 2000 the Danish policymakers considered to change the FIT 
system into a trading green certificate system due to a political preference of a TGC 
system at that time. However, the plan was postponed in 2000 as the industry was 
considered not ready for the new scheme. In 2002 the proposal was postponed 
indefinitely when the political preference shifted back to the FIT system and when it 
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was clear that a common European certificate market was not possible in the near 
future (Agnolucci, 2005).  
Instead, a feed-in premium policy was adopted in 2001 in a Danish electricity reform 
aiming at liberalizing the renewable energy market. In the modified policy the support 
level was substantially reduced. Newly built wind farms no longer received a fixed 
amount from the utilities; instead, they had to sell the electricity at market price, and 
were only compensated by an environmental premium of 100 DDK/MWh, about 
€13/MWh at that time (Lipp, 2007). On the other hand, the old sites could still be 
covered by a price of €80.5/MWh for the next 10 years operation. The new 
compensation level was considered to be too low and it could not sustain the 
development in the industry. The industry almost did not make any progress after a 
transition period in 2002. During 2003 to 2008 there was only 21 MW of new 
capacity built, representing about 0.7% of the industry’s scale. The market 
participants used a silent way to prove that the new policy was not appropriate for the 
industry. It was still too early to expect that the wind industry can be economically 
competitive. 
In 2009 the policy makers finally decided to increase the support level. The 
environmental premium was increased to about €34 for the first 22000 full load hours 
of the wind projects. 22000 full load hours is about 2.5 years. Considering a capacity 
factor of about 25%, the total estimated compensation period is about 10 years. This 
premium adds on top of the market price which would also be received by the wind 
developers. The increase of the feed-in premium encouraged a recovery of the 
industry. 2009 became a turning point for the wind industry and the total installed 
capacity increased by 10%. Following is a table of the total installed capacity from 
2001 to 2009. 
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Table 6: Installed Wind Capacity: 2001 - 2009 (MW) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Capacity 2489  2889 3115 3123 3127 3135 3124 3136 3465 
Source: GWEC 2009 
A key difference between the feed-in premium in Denmark and the FIT scheme in 
Germany is that the first one is paid on top of the market price. As a result, the wind 
developers in Denmark still need to face the price volatility from the market, and 
adjust the production according to the fluctuation of market demand and supply. It 
also involves more market competition to the wind developers, as they are responsible 
for the marketing of their own electricity and need to provide a higher quality and 
reliability. The feed-in premium system can be considered as an advanced level of the 
FIT and more suitable for a market where the technology is more mature. The system 
introduces some degree of uncertainty, but provides incentives for wind developers to 
better adapt themselves to the market and thus increases the overall efficiency. 
Target Compliance 
Denmark’s FIT system helped the country to fulfill the target in the early years. In 
1990 Denmark set up a target of 1,300 MW by the end of 2000, which was quite 
ambitious at that time. The target was easily passed and in 2000 Denmark had already 
about 2400 MW of capacity. An updated target set up in 1996, aiming at building 
1500MW by 2005, was also satisfied many years before the deadline. Denmark’s 
experience shows the FIT’s advantage in promoting capacity installations and meeting 
targets. 
Currently Denmark has 20% of the electricity consumption supplied by wind. An 
ultimate target of the Danish policymaker is to supply 50% of the national electricity 
consumption by wind in 2025. This is the most ambitious plan on renewable 
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promotion in the world. 
Price 
Using a fixed subsidy system, Denmark has a wind promotion cost almost decided by 
the compensation level. The level of the feed-in premium from 2009 is €34/MWh, 
adding to the average wholesale price at €46/MWh. Thus, the total remuneration level 
for the first 22000 hours (about ten years) is about €80/MWh. The compensation level 
is comparable to the German level. If we firstly assume no productivity difference 
among years and do not consider the capital cost (thus we use a payback method), the 
average payment over 20 years for each MWh of electricity in Germany is about 
€60/MWh (as calculated before), while in Denmark it is about €63/MWh.3 
We can also introduce some possible discount rates and make a sensitivity analysis 
using a NPV method. The assumed discount rates are 5%, 6%, 7% and 8% 
respectively. The cash flows in the first ten years are assumed to be €80/MWh 
(electricity price + premium) and in the last ten years are €46/MWh (only the 
electricity price). The result of the sensitivity analysis is shown as follows, and we 
also make a comparison with the result obtained in the Germany section. It can be 
seen that with the discount rates the compensation levels in the two countries are very 
similar. The level in Denmark is slightly higher using our assumed discount rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
3
 It is calculated through taking an arithmetic average of the compensation for 20 years, with the first ten years at 
€80/MWh (electricity price + premium) and the last ten years at €46/MWh (only the electricity price). 
  
54 
Table 7: The Average NPV of the Compensation Levels in Germany and Denmark  
Discount Rate 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Average NPV of the 
FIT per MWh over 20 
years in Germany  
€40.3/MWh €37.6/MWh 
 
€35.2/MWh €33/MWh 
     
Average NPV of the 
Compensation per 
MWh over 20 years in 
Denmark 
€41.8/MWh €38.9/MWh €36.3/MWh €34/MWh 
The standstill of capacity growth during the period between 2003 and 2008 proved the 
importance of deciding the right price for the developers. In a feed-in system the price 
of the renewables is set up by the regulators. If an appropriate price is fixed, the 
uncertainty of the projects can be decreased. On the contrary, if the price is not 
suitable, there is no possibility to adjust it unless the regulators can change the policy. 
Nevertheless, a feed-in policy is usually designed for a long time frame in order to 
ensure the long-term security and reduce the regulatory risk faced by the generators. 
The flexibility of such policy is thus quite low. An inappropriate price will hamper the 
development of the industry for a long period, just as shown in the history of wind 
diffusion in Denmark. The premium of 100 DKK/MWh in the system is too low so 
the resource potential of the country cannot be exploited. 
Risk 
The feed-in premium scheme shares some characteristics with both the normal FIT 
and the green certificate scheme in terms of risk exposure. It reduces the uncertainty 
of the wind developers by providing a fixed compensation to cover part of the 
generation cost; on the other hand, the developers will still face the price risk and 
quantity risk from the market so there are strong incentives for them to reduce cost 
and adapt their production to the market demand. It retains the advantage of a TGC 
system but avoids adding too much uncertainty to the wind developers. In this sense, 
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it is very suitable for a technology which is relatively more mature.  
Diversity 
Denmark also differentiates the compensation levels paid to different energy sources. 
However, the country does not aim to pursue a highly diversified energy portfolio but 
instead has a strong strategic reliance on wind power. This tendency can be easily 
observed from the latest tariff level released in 2009. For instance, solar electricity is 
only given a FIT of about €80/MWh, which is far from making it economically viable. 
The system thus provides only a symbolic support for solar PV despite of the FIT 
given. 
Biomass has also an important position in Denmark’s electricity portfolio and 
accounts for about 9% of the total electricity production in the country. The support 
level in the 2004 system was a FIT of about €80/MWh and in the new system it was 
changed to a feed-in premium of €20.5/MWh. The support level was actually reduced 
by more than €10/MWh considering an average electricity price of about €46/MWh.  
Denmark still holds the second highest offshore wind capacity in the world, only 
second to the UK. In the 2009 regulation there is not a differentiated tariff design for 
the onshore and offshore wind power on the state level. Special premium is given 
directly to specific offshore projects and wind farms, based on the resource situation 
in the farms and the cost incurred. Considering the possibility that Denmark will put 
more strategic reliance on the offshore field, a separated feed-in premium may be 
given for offshore wind generation in the near future. 
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Table 8: Tariff Level for Different Renewable Sources in Denmark 2009(€/MWh) 
 Onshore Wind Offshore Wind Biomass Small Hydro Solar 
Tariff 
Market Price + 
33.6 
Market Price + 
33.6 
Market 
Price + 20.5 
80.5 80.5 
Source: EREF, 2009 
4.5 Summary 
The above sections have discussed the development of wind power and the influence 
of the support schemes in the four target countries: Germany, the UK, the US (Texas 
State as an example) and Denmark. A comparison of the main parameters is 
summarized in the following table and the difference between countries is explained 
in detail later in this section. 
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Table 9: Comparison of Wind Power Development in Four Countries 
 Germany The UK Texas Denmark 
Scheme Types FIT TGC TGC 
Feed-in 
Premium 
Resource Quality     
Average Capacity 
Factor 
17% 25% 23% 25% 
Growth Indicators     
Cumulative 
Installed Wind 
Capacity in 2009 
25.8 GW 4 GW 9.4 GW 3.5 GW 
Wind Generated 
Electricity in 2008 
40.4 TWh 5.8 TWh 16.3 TWh 7.6 TWh 
Target Compliance Yes No Yes Yes 
Share in Electricity 
Consumption 
7% 1.7% 6.9% 
About 
20% 
Compensation 
Level 
    
Total 
Compensation per 
MWh 
€92 for 5 
years, €50.2 
for 15 years  
5 year ROC 
average€57.3 + 
Wholesale€47 
5 year REC 
average€4.5 + 
PTC€16.5 for 10 
years + 
Wholesale€55 
€33.6 for 
10 years + 
Wholesale
€46 
Risk     
Subject to Market 
Volatility 
No Yes Yes Yes 
 
The four countries use different types of schemes to foster the development of 
renewable energy. Germany and Denmark use similar feed- in systems. The difference 
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is that the FIT system in Germany secures the whole tariff paid to renewable 
generators while the feed-in premium system in Denmark guarantees only the 
premium part above the market price. The UK and Texas in the US both use tradable 
green certificate system. The two systems are rather similar except that the ROC 
market in the UK uses a special buy-out penalty mechanism which increases the 
complexity of the whole system.  
The four countries all have above-average wind resources. The UK and Denmark both 
keep a high capacity factor of about 25% in recent years. Both countries also have 
excellent offshore potentials for future development. The average Texas capacity 
factor in recent years is slightly lower at about 23%. However, considering the high 
penetration rate in Texas and the fact that some sites cannot work at their full capacity 
due to transmission constraints and network pressure, the real capacity factor should 
be at least as high as the UK and Denmark ones. The resources in Germany are a bit 
less favorable. The country reported a capacity factor of 16.8% in 2009, which 
implies that the unit generation cost in Germany should be considerably higher than 
the other three places.  
Despite having less outstanding resources, Germany can be considered as a successful 
example of using the FIT system to stimulate the penetration of renewable energy. 
The country has both a high capacity deployment rate and good target compliance 
records. 7% of its total power consumption comes from wind generation. The Texas 
state has also great achievements in its wind development. The installed capacity has 
surpassed the long-term targets set by regulators long before the specified deadline 
and contributes to 6.9% of the state’s total consumption. However, it is necessary to 
point out that the objective set by the Texas regulators is relatively conservative, and 
the state should have further potentials in exploiting its resources. Being the pioneer 
of wind energy, Denmark experienced some obstacles in the growth of wind capacity 
in the 2000s. The installed capacity ceased growth for about 6 years because of an 
inadequate feed-in premium level. The wind industry in the country regained its 
growth in 2009 when the support system was revised. The country now has 20% of 
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the electricity demand met by wind power, which is the highest penetration rate in the 
world. The growth of the UK wind power market was not as satisfactory. The total 
installed capacity remains quite low and it fails to fulfill the targets designed by the 
policymakers, in spite of the good resources available. 
The tradable certificate system is generally expected to create cost advantages over 
the feed-in system because it involves more market competition to create incentives 
for cost reduction. Whether this objective can be achieved depends on the functioning 
of the system. Below is a brief comparison of the total compensation paid to the wind 
generators for generating every MWh of electricity in the four markets:  
 In Germany, the FIT for the first five years of a project is €92/MWh, and for the 
last fifteen years is €50.2/MWh. 
 In the UK, the average ROC price in the recent 5 years is €57.3/MWh. The 
average wholesale electricity price is about €47/MWh. 
 In Texas, the average REC price in the recent 5 years is €4.5/MWh. The PTC, as 
an additional support from the federal level, is €16.5/MWh for the first ten years 
of the project. The average wholesale electricity price is about €55/MWh. 
 In Denmark, the feed-in premium given to the generators in the first 10 years of 
the project is €33.6/MWh. The average wholesale electricity price is €46/MWh. 
We can compare the price levels in the four countries over a 20-year timeframe. The 
purpose here is giving a rough comparison in order to obtain a general picture of the 
compensation levels in the four countries, so we make some assumptions to simplify 
the comparison. 
 The wholesale electricity price is assumed to stay at the current level over the 
20-year period.  
 The certificate prices in the UK and Texas are assumed to fluctuate within 20% of 
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the 5-year average price we mention above.  
Figure 12: Compensation Levels to Wind Generators at the 2009 Standard (€/MWh)  
From the comparison it can be seen that the UK has the highest extra compensation 
paid to the wind generators given our assumption. Texas, though having a low 
certificate price, has a quite high total compensation level due to the high electricity 
price in the region. The total compensation levels in Germany and Denmark are quite 
similar, as has been discussed in the Denmark section. 
The high cost of the UK ROC system can be largely attributed to its buy-out penalty 
fee system. The buy-out fee creates incentives for existing renewable generators to 
undersupply because the demand surplus will raise the value of the ROCs. In addition, 
the ownership structure of the wind industry deteriorates the problem as a majority of 
wind capacity is directly or indirectly owned by the major generators. They also have 
incentives to control further investments because they are not willing to see the crash 
of ROC price. Furthermore, the price risk of the ROC market and the high upfront 
investment of the wind industry create entry barriers to small new investors. All these 
three factors together can explain why the UK market is undersupplied given the high 
ROC price.  
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The Texas market maintains high growth in the last decade; however, the regulators 
were conservative in measuring the resource potential of the state and set up relatively 
low renewable targets, so the capacity growth cannot be attributed to the certificate 
market. The targets were easily surpassed due to the excellent resources and the 
Production Tax Credit subsidy from the federal level which provides a fixed amount 
benefit to the generators. The certificate market was thus oversupplied and the 
regulators did not adjust the target accordingly. The certificate price became 
extremely low and can no longer function as a stimulus for new investments. Now 
only the Production Tax Credit from the federal level is supporting the Texas wind 
industry. The Texas system may have achieved the targets of the regulators, but most 
of the development of the market should be attributed to the PTC policy instead of the 
certificate scheme.  
In the feed-in schemes the price of the renewables is decided by the regulators instead 
of the market. A mistake in deciding the price can have serious consequences. In 2001 
the Danish policymakers set up a premium of about €13/MWh for the wind generators, 
which was considered too low by the market. The growth of the whole industry 
stopped for 6 years as new investments were not economically viable at the given 
price. The industry started to recover only when the price was changed in 2009. The 
case reflects the importance of setting a FIT that correctly reflects the cost borne by 
the renewable developers.  
With regard to the risk issue, the wind developers in the UK and Texas are exposed to 
significantly more uncertainty than those in Germany and Denmark. Under a green 
certificate system the investors have to bear the volatility of both the certificate 
market and the electricity market. In addition, regulatory risk cannot be ignored as 
shown by the Texas case, where a conservative renewable obligation setting leads to 
the collapse of the market. The early success of the Texas market demonstrated that 
long-term contracts may be a solution to the risk exposure brought by a certificate 
market; however, a stable market environment should be established in order to 
maintain the enthusiasm of both the investors and the retailers to enter such long-term 
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contracts.  
The feed-in system provides high investment certainty and thus becomes efficient in 
promoting the market at an early stage. Nevertheless, guaranteeing a fixed income and 
priority network access, as conducted by Germany’s policy, may totally eliminate 
market competition and reduce the incentives for quality control and production 
adjustment. In comparison, the feed-in premium system in Denmark is a better 
combination of risk reduction and market competition: investors are secured a part of 
cash flow, but still have to adjust themselves actively according to the demand 
situation of the market. It fits well for a more mature market like Denmark. 
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5. Discussion of the Main Characteristics of TGC and FIT 
From the country cases elaborated above, it is possible to observe some main 
differences of the tradable green certificate scheme (TGC) and the feed-in tariff 
measure (FIT). In the following chapter a comparison of the two frameworks is 
presented to evaluate their effectiveness and efficiency in promoting renewable 
energy. 
5.1 Scheme Complexity  
The designs of the FIT and the TGC schemes originate from two significantly 
different approaches. The feed-in scheme fixes the price while the TGC system 
decides the quantity and the market demand. Theoretically, a good design of both 
systems will require information of the resource potential of the country and the 
marginal cost curve of the industry. In practice this information is difficult to 
accurately estimate, so the design of both systems has to be conducted under 
imperfect information. 
The design of a FIT relies mostly on the estimate of the cost structure of the industry. 
It is normally not very complicated to obtain the information on the current average 
generation cost. The difficulty of the mechanism lies on an accurate estimate of the 
average cost over a long period (including the capital cost), as a FIT policy is often 
guaranteed for a long time frame (usually more than 10 years) in order to provide a 
high degree of policy stability and reduce the regulatory risk. It is crucial to make 
reasonably accurate predictions of the learning curve of the industry to design a 
digressed tariff framework, which can provide more pressure on cost reductions for 
the generators. If the estimate of the learning curve is too positive, it may result in a 
lack of compensation to the generators. Consequently the generation cannot be 
economically viable and the effectiveness of the policy will be curbed. On the other 
hand, an over-negative estimate may lead to overcompensation to the generators and 
increase the total cost of promoting renewable energy. 
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Usually a too low compensation has more obvious effects and is easier to be detected. 
The history of the Danish wind industry is a good example of it. A timely revise of the 
system can solve the problem. A too high compensation is much more difficult to 
discover, given that the project cycle is often more than 20 years. Therefore, in most 
cases the FIT can only decide a price that is acceptable to the regulators, but cannot 
guarantee it is low enough. This is the primary concern on the FIT system. 
The TGC system, on the contrary, relies on the design of an appropriate quota. If the 
quota is higher than what the market is willing to supply, the supply of green 
certificates from the market may be insufficient. As a consequence, the utilities or the 
retailers will then have to bear a higher financial pressure if a strict non-compliance 
penalty is implemented. Although it is reasonable to expect that a high price of the 
certificate will stimulate more supply, shorten the distance to the quota and ultimately 
drive down its price, a mature unbundled market structure is the prerequisite. Some 
defects of the market may stop the market from functioning well, as shown in the UK 
case.  
A too low quota limits the development potential of a region. If the target set by the 
regulators does not reflect the resource potential of the region, the renewable 
resources cannot be well utilized. As shown in the Texas case, the quota designed for 
2025 has been achieved in 2010 due to the compensation from the federal PTC. If 
there is no the involvement of the PTC, it is not possible for Texas to achieve such a 
wind power boom. The development of the great resource potential would be largely 
limited by the conservative goal-setting. 
In summary, the main disadvantage of the FIT is the difficulty to guarantee that the 
price is close to the actual cost of the industry, while the TGC is weak when it comes 
to ensuring that the resources of the country is fully developed. The final choice of 
scheme will depend on the primary concern of the regulators: to ensure the lowest 
cost or to get more capacity developed. 
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5.2 Capacity Deployment and Target Compliance 
The FIT system has proved to be more effective in stimulating new capacity building. 
Most of the capacity built currently in the world is promoted by a FIT scheme. The 
two most successful examples in Europe, Germany and Spain, are both using a FIT 
system to subsidize its wind penetration. The effectiveness of a FIT in promoting new 
capacity can be easily explained from its mechanism. As the tariff is usually 
constructed as the estimated cost plus a reasonable profit, investors can obtain a 
satisfactory profit by entering this business if they have an average performance. 
Provided that the tariff and the connection to the grid are guaranteed, there is low 
pressure from competition and low entry barriers. Theoretically new investors will 
flow in until all the promising sites are fully explored. The only thing the investors 
need to be concerned with is to lower its cost as much as possible to produce more 
profit, as the revenue is fixed. The long period of FIT enhances the investment 
certainty and further triggers new investments. Some specific policy designs in some 
countries, for instance the site-differentiated structure used in Germany, will also have 
positive influences on new penetration. 
In the TGC system, the actual development will be largely determined by the quota 
set by the policy makers. It is pointed out that the mandated targets may set the upper 
limit for capacity development (Sawin, 2004). Such concern is reasonable because 
passing the mandated quota produces no new values for the generators, since the 
market may crash after that. An expected behavior for the existing players will hence 
be to keep the supply slightly lower than the quota level to maintain the price. Even if 
the resource potential is not fully explored, the production will not move forward. To 
conclude, the enthusiasm of the policymakers can to a large extent determine how far 
a TGC scheme can go. If only a conservative goal is set, an efficient TGC market will 
produce a relatively low price on certificates and the penetration level will remain 
low.  
In terms of target compliance, theoretically the performance of the market under the 
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FIT is not related to the target set by regulators. However, since the FIT is very 
effective in stimulating new capacity installed, in most cases it can also meet the 
policy targets. The TGC is closely related to the target and theoretically it should be 
effective in target compliance. But a good compliance of the TGC target requires a 
strict penalty system and a low entry barrier, as discussed in the UK case. 
5.3 Risk Reduction 
The uncertainty level of a support system is also a significant factor that affects the 
level of new installations. As described in the previous chapters, the revenues of the 
generators under a TGC scheme are exposed to fluctuating prices both from the 
electricity and the certificate markets, which will inevitably increase their risk 
premium. This creates obstacles to the new investors compared to those under a FIT 
scheme, which provides a high degree of investment certainty over a long period.    
The emergence of long-term contracts is often expected by researchers as a 
market-based solution to this problem (Van der Linden et al, 2005; Wiser et al, 2004). 
If long-term agreements can be reached between generators and retailers at a 
reasonable price to sell certificates, the risk involved in the system will be 
significantly reduced and new installations can be stimulated. The early successful 
years of the Texas market are often used as evidence to this argument (Langniss and 
Wiser, 2003). However, the emergence of long-term contracts must fulfill some 
requirements: 
 Compliance target: The quota needs to be high enough to create a high 
demand for certificates. 
 Price uncertainty: There should be an expectation of potentially high 
certificate price.  
 Compliance pressure: The support scheme should at least have a binding target 
with high penalties for incompliance.  
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The above requirements need to be fulfilled in order for both the retailers and the 
generators to be willing to enter an agreement. If the quota is not high enough and the 
certificate price is too low, as shown in the Texas market, it is impossible for both 
parties to seek long-term contracts. On the other hand, the UK market is an example 
of a low compliance pressure. Though the retailers need to pay a buy-out fee for 
incompliance, the penalty will be recycled back to them in proportion to the 
certificates they have presented. Consequently, as long as they have delivered some 
certificates, they are able to get part of the penalty back, which reduces the binding 
power of the policy. 
5.4 Cost reduction 
A general concern on the FIT system is towards the cost-efficiency issue. The FIT is 
considered as an expensive policy as there is little competition between the generators. 
The industry is allowed to obtain a reasonable profit, which lessens the cost pressure 
of the producers. However, it is worthwhile to mention that the incentive for cost 
reduction is actually well embedded in the FIT mechanism. As the revenue level 
received is fixed, a lower operation cost will increase the profit of the generators. 
Therefore cost-minimization will be certainly placed as one of the core strategies for 
the generation companies. Besides, a large proportion of the wind generation cost is 
the upfront investment cost, which is highly dependent on the development of the 
wind technology. The competition of the equipment manufacturing industry can be 
fierce which will automatically drive the fixed cost down. Therefore, it is still 
reasonable to expect that the wind generation industry under a FIT scheme will follow 
a normal learning curve. 
The TGC system is theoretically believed to be more cost-effective. More competition 
is involved in this system. New and more cost-effective generators can supply 
certificates at a lower price, taking away the market share of the old and high-cost 
companies. The competition is expected to create dynamics within the industry and to 
drive the industrial cost down. However, the price of the certificates still has to be 
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higher than the extra generation cost of the renewable sources, in order to be effective 
in stimulating new investments. In this sense, it will not be significantly lower than 
the cost of a well-designed FIT. The higher uncertainty of the TGC scheme should 
also be taken into consideration. It may reduce the cost advantage of the system. 
5.5 Quality Improvement and Network Integration 
The quality of the generated electricity is also an important factor to be considered as 
it will significantly influence the result of the network integration. Renewable 
generated electricity is less stable than the conventional sources. In addition, many 
renewable sources, such as wind, are intermittent power, which is less reliable and 
provides higher pressure to the grid. The generation of electricity cannot be controlled 
and it may result in low level of generation during the peak demand or the opposite. A 
control on generation quality and adaption of the generation to the market demand 
hence become necessary. 
The quality control issue is often regarded as a drawback of a FIT system. This is due 
to the priority access of renewable generation to the network, a policy frequently 
combined with the feed-in scheme in order to reduce the investment risk. As it is the 
system operators’ obligation to accept all the electricity produced from renewable 
sources, the generators do not have pressure to improve the generation quality to 
facilitate integration, nor do they have sufficient incentives to adjust their production 
according to the market demand. As a consequence most of them implement a 
cost-minimizing strategy and produce as much electricity as possible. 
Conversely, the quality pressure under a TGC scheme is much higher. The certificate 
market is separated from the electricity market, and the renewable generators are 
responsible for the marketing and sale of their electricity like a conventional generator. 
They may not be able to sell the electricity if the quality does not meet the required 
standard. They will try to reduce load fluctuation in order to avoid a possible 
balancing penalty from the regulators. They also have higher motivations to adjust the 
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production to the market demand by running slightly below the full capacity to 
facilitate the grid conditions. A higher awareness on quality control and production 
adjustment can greatly facilitate the integration of renewable energy into the network 
and reduce the grid pressure. 
The feed-in premium policy, adopted by Denmark, can be seen as an improvement of 
the FIT in this aspect. Under the feed-in premium scheme, the generators are only 
secured a fixed premium, but are wholly responsible for the sale of their electricity. 
Therefore they are subject to the same pressure described before as the ones under the 
TGC scheme and the generation quality will be improved. 
5.6 Resource Utilization 
If a country’s objective is to fully explore its wind resources, the development cannot 
be limited only to those most windy areas. Besides, developing the less-windy sites 
can help to avoid the over-concentration of the wind farms in a specific region, which 
may challenge the network reliability of the region. In most cases, the FIT is more 
flexible than the TGC system in fully utilizing a country’s resources. 
The basic principle of a FIT system is to develop as many resources as possible at a 
stable and reasonable cost. The scheme is flexible and can be easily adjusted in order 
to support all the promising sites. Most of the FIT systems, for instance Germany and 
China, have site-differentiated tariff policies, which have been proved highly efficient. 
In Germany a wind field with less productivity than average in its first five years’ 
operation can be entitled to a higher level of remuneration for a longer period, 
compared to those advantageous sites. In China the system is also straightforward. 
Four different tariff levels are applied in four regions, reflecting the resource quality 
and profitability of the wind mills. As the cost information is relatively easy to obtain, 
such a design does not increase the complexity of the system.  
The differentiated tariff design helps to avoid waste of resources in some seemingly 
less promising sites, but it should be recognized that it will also increase the total 
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average cost of promoting renewable energy. Therefore, the actual choice will have to 
depend on the renewable strategy of a country. The TGC system, conversely, aims to 
promote the renewable sources at a least possible social cost. This is a very different 
philosophy which will encourage the concentration of wind generation in the most 
cost-effective sites. 
Under a TGC system it is also possible to promote less windy farms, but the actual 
implementation is more complicated and so far there are no successful examples in 
application. A possible solution is to grant more certificates for poor wind sites for 
every unit of generation, however, it is complicated to decide the appropriate number 
of certificates to be granted. Due to the fluctuating price in the certificate market, it 
may easily lead to overcompensation or insufficient compensation. For countries 
which would like to maximize the utilization of their wind resources, this will be a 
huge challenge when they try to adopt a TGC system. 
5.7 Renewable Diversity 
Similar to promoting wind sites with different resource quality, the promotion of a 
diversified energy mix will also highly depend on a country’s energy strategy. Overall 
speaking, a feed-in system is more convenient and flexible to stimulate development 
of different resources, if the policy makers consider it necessary. Different energy 
sources can be granted different levels of the tariff to cover the necessary cost. This 
method is straightforward and an appropriate amount of compensation paid to the 
generators is easier to calculate. Another merit of the FIT is that different policies will 
not influence each other. As long as a company can control the generation cost under 
the tariff, the project can be profitable. There is no competition from other energy 
sources, which to some degree protects some immature renewable industries, such as 
the solar energy. Germany and Spain are both successful examples in using the FIT to 
support diversity.  
The characteristics of the FIT have also made it more favorable to small scale 
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generators, which are important sources of energy diversity. For some small 
distributed generators it may be difficult to compete with the big players in the 
electricity market and the certificate market. Priority grid access and a fixed payment 
can greatly reduce their risk and enable average household and small investors to 
enjoy the benefit from renewable investments. 
In the early stage of many TGC systems diversity is usually not among the core 
objectives. The fundamental principle of the TGC mechanism focuses on the 
development of technologies with the lowest social cost. Theoretically production will 
mostly concentrate on the most mature technology. A TGC system can also promote 
renewable diversity but it requires more sophisticated designs. It can be conducted 
either by using an integrated certificate market or through issuing a new quota.  
An integrated certificate market is implemented in the case of the UK. Renewable 
generators of various sources are given different amount of certificates for every kWh 
of electricity generated, reflecting different cost levels. This method may encounter 
difficulties as it is complicated to decide the right amount of certificates to be granted, 
the same problem as discussed in the resource utilization section. The price of 
certificates fluctuates and it is almost impossible to guarantee that the remuneration 
level to the generators is appropriate. In addition, under such a system competition 
exists across different sources, which may pose challenges to less mature technologies. 
It may happen that a large amount of certificates generated from wind sources will 
flow into the market, drive down the prices and take away the quota. Under such 
circumstances it is likely that ultimately most of the subsidy will still go to the 
lowest-cost technology. 
Issuing a new quota scheme can avoid the influences from different sources and 
guarantee that the target technologies are promoted. Generators of the promoted 
source can get an independent price, which is determined by its own market and more 
correctly reflects the cost incurred. Texas is using a similar system by releasing a 
“non-wind” quota that is specifically for other technologies, but the system is not 
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binding at present so the market has not really started to work. The shortcoming of 
issuing a new quota scheme is its complexity in administration and operation, both 
from the regulatory and the generator perspectives. 
The table summarizes this chapter about the main characteristics of FIT and TGC.  
Table 10: Comparison of Main Characteristics of FIT and TGC 
 Feed-in System 
Tradable Green Certificate 
Market 
Stimulating New 
Capacity 
More effective Less effective 
Target Compliance Effective Effective 
Risk Reduction More effective Less effective 
Cost Reduction 
Acceptable but not 
lowest 
Lowest given good system 
functioning 
Quality and 
Network Integration 
FIT less effective; 
Premium system more 
effective 
More Effective 
Resource Utilization More effective Less effective 
Stimulating 
Diversity 
More effective Less effective 
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6. Evaluation of the Potential Norwegian-Swedish 
Common TGC Market  
In this chapter a discussion is presented for the potential cooperation of Norway and 
Sweden in building a joint green certificate market. The chapter is structured as 
follows: First, there is a brief introduction to the agreement between Norway and 
Sweden regarding a green certificate market. Second, an overview is presented on the 
current green certificate market in Sweden, and an assessment is given on the 
outcome of the system. Third, the objective of Norway to entering such a market is 
tentatively described. After that the author evaluates the potential influence of a joint 
green certificate market on Norway and whether it could achieve its objectives. 
Finally, policy suggestions are made regarding this issue. 
6.1 Introduction to the Agreement 
On September 2009 Norway and Sweden agreed to establish a common green 
certificate market. The market is expected to start functioning from January 2012. 
This is the result of a five year negotiation since 2004. The actual quota and market 
design will be decided during 2010 and 2011. In 2009 Sweden announced that its 
2020 target for renewable energy production is to increase by 25 TWh from the 2003 
level. This is estimated to be about a 13 TWh increase from the 2012 level. Norway 
has agreed to adopt a renewable target with a similar level under the joint certificate 
market. A possible quota, as disclosed by Statnett (2010), would be a 26 TWh 
additional renewable electricity generation from 2012 to 2020 for the two countries in 
total, splitting into equal shares of 13 TWh. Support through green certificates will be 
offered until 2035.   
There is only limited information disclosed regarding the design of the market. The 
most important information available to the public so far is that the certificate market 
will be technology neutral and size neutral. This has significant implication to the 
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industry. As discussed in the UK and Texas case, a technology neutral system will not 
promote the diversity of renewable development. We have seen from previous 
evaluation that the system has a strong concern on cost minimization and the 
development will only focus on the eligible technology with the lowest cost.  
6.2 Overview of the Swedish TGC System 
Electricity consumption accounts for 36% of Sweden’s final energy use. In 2008 
Sweden produced 146 TWh of electricity. 97% of the country’s electric production is 
emission free. Hydropower and nuclear power are the main sources, supplying 
respectively 47% and 42% of the country’s electricity. Biomass-fueled plants supplied 
about 7% and wind power plants contributed to about 1%. The proportion of the 
electricity generated by fossil fuels has been substantially reduced since 2000s due to 
the rapid development of biomass-based generation. (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009). 
The Swedish TGC system started operation in 2003. It organizes a similar certificate 
market as the UK and Texas do. Originally the quota obligation was imposed on the 
electricity consumers. In 2006 the mandated party was changed to the retailers. It is 
also a technology neutral system. Eligible renewable sources include wind power, 
biomass, geothermal power, solar power, small scale hydropower (<1.5 MW) and 
wave power. Combined heat and power plants (CHP), though not emission-free, are 
also included in the scheme. They all receive one certificate through generating one 
MWh of electricity. 
Both the existing renewable capacity and the new capacity could be eligible to green 
certificates. In 2003 the existing plants could generate 6.5 TWh of electricity. The 
existing plants were guaranteed certificates until 2012 or 2014 (depending on whether 
they receive other government support). Newly-built plants can receive compensation 
from selling certificates for 15 years. 
The initial quota was set to increase the share of renewable energy in total energy 
consumption from 7.4% in 2003 to 16.9% in 2010, which corresponded 
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approximately to a 10 TWh increase in renewable generation from 2002 (I6.5 TWh in 
2002 + 10TWh increase). In 2006 a new quota for 2016 was set to increase the 
generation from the 2002 basis by 17TWh. Subsequently in 2009 the target was 
adjusted to a 25 TWh increase from 2002 to 2020, so in total the targeted generation is 
31.5 TWh (6.5TWh in 2002 + 25TWh increase). In each year the regulators will set 
up a specific quota. A strict penalty is imposed for incompliance and collected by the 
state. The fee is set to 150% of the average certificate price in the previous year. 
During 2003 and 2004, the penalty fee was limited to SEK 175 and SEK 240 
respectively. In practice this worked as an efficient price ceiling, and thus considered 
to undermine the effectiveness of the system. Currently the regulators do not put any 
price cap for this penalty, so the effectiveness of the penalty system is high. 
6.3 Evaluation of the Swedish TGC System   
Target Compliance 
The Swedish TGC system has good performance in meeting the quota. In 2008 8.5 
TWh of new generation had been added to the 2002 level, keeping good compliance 
record. Since 2004 the compliance rate in each year has been higher than 99%, which 
can be largely attributed to a strict penalty system. The following table shows the 
quota compliance record between 2003 and 2008. 
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Table 11: Renewable Generation and Quota Compliance in Sweden 2003 - 2008 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Liable El Consumption 
(TWh) 
63.3 97.4 97.6 97.1 96 94 
Quota 7.4% 8.1% 10.4% 12.6% 15.1% 16.3% 
Required Certificate 
(Million) 
4.7 7.9 10.1 12.4 14.5 15.3 
Fulfilled Certificate 
(Million) 
3.5 7.8 10.1 12.4 14.5 15.3 
Total Renewable 
Generation (TWh) 
8,5 11 11,3 12,2 13,3 15 
Compliance 77% 99.2% 99.9% 99.9% 99.8%
4
 100% 
Source: Electricity Certificate System 2009, Swedish Energy Agency 
Since 2003 the quota has been increased twice. When the renewable development was 
in a good trend a new and more ambitious quota was raised. The flexible adjustment 
of the quota guarantees the financial stability of the TGC market and helps to better 
exploit the country’s renewable potentials. 
Generation Mix 
Of the 15 TWh of renewable electricity in 2008, nearly 70% was contributed by 
biomass and peat generation. This generation came mainly from biomass-based CHP 
plants. About 17% was from small scale hydropower. Although wind power has 
grown rapidly since 2006, its share remains quite small at about 13%. 
A closer look at the installations of the renewable capacity reveals that most of the 
increased generation actually comes from improved productivity of the existing plants. 
                                                             
4
 Certificates generated in previous years can be banked and used for compliance. So although the generation in 
2007 was lower than mandated, the compliance rate can still be almost 100%. 
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For instance, the biomass generation grew by about 50% from 2003 to 2008, but the 
capacity installation growth was only about 10%. The same applies to hydro and wind 
power. According to the Swedish Energy Agency (2009), only 2.5 TWh of the 
renewable electricity produced in 2008 were generated in the plants invested after 
2003. The other 12.5 TWh was from those plants that were already in operation 
before the introduction of the TGC system. These plants increased their renewable 
output through improving the productivity in the biomass-based CHP plants or 
converting fossil-fueled plants to biomass-fueled. Such projects can be done with 
small capital input and low risk, so they are more welcomed by the investors. 
Table 12: Renewable Development in Sweden by Sources 2003 – 2008  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Biomass & Peat       
Capacity (MW) 3,157 3,185 3,424 3,643 3,676 3,451 
Generation (GWh) 6,327 7,671 7,926 8,594 9,049 9,599 
Hydro       
Capacity (MW) 491 504 517 540 558 598 
Generation (GWh) 1,446 1,968 1,799 2,019 2,195 2,607 
Wind       
Capacity (MW) 401 472 530 583 831 1,074 
Generation (GWh) 684 865 939 988 1,432 1,996 
Total Generation 8,460 11,048 11,298 12,157 13,256 15,037 
Source: Electricity Certificate System 2009, Swedish Energy Agency 
Although wind power has not achieved a significant growth yet (The current market 
size is less than 1/3 of Denmark’s market), the current production has shown a good 
resource potential of the country. During 2003 to 2008 the wind power industry 
reached an average capacity factor of 20%. The resources are not as excellent as the 
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sites in the UK and Texas, but still much better than some average quality sites like 
the ones in Germany. The primary reason for the low development of the wind power 
in the country is the technology neutral system. As the biomass-based CHP has 
considerably lower cost, most of the investments will go to those projects so the quota 
would be met with the lowest possible social cost. Besides, as illustrated in the 
previous chapters, under the TGC system investors will favor more the low fixed cost 
technology like biomass because it has lower capital input. Under the tech-neutral 
system, wind power can get substantial development only when the quota is set 
sufficiently high and when the resources of the lower-cost technology have been 
utilized. In this case the certificate price can be high enough to compensate for the 
investment cost of wind power. However, this may lead to over-compensation in the 
system, which is discussed in the next section.  
Cost Control 
The Swedish TGC system has managed to maintain a low certificate price. The price 
moved between 190 SEK/MWh and 250 SEK/MWh during 2003 to 2008. The 
following table lists the average prices of the six years. The average price level is 
about €23 / MWh, comparable to the compensation level for the wind power market 
in Texas (including the PTC part). Considering the increased generation and the cost 
level, the Swedish TGC system should be considered as cost efficient in social terms, 
as the target is met with very low social cost.  
Table 13: Price Development of the Swedish TGC 2003 – 2008  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Average Price 
(SEK) 
201 231 216 191 195 247 
Source: Electricity Certificate System 2009, Swedish Energy Agency 
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Allocation Effects and Profitability Issues 
Ensuring fairness is also a crucial task of a well-functioning TGC system. The costs 
and benefits should be reasonably allocated among the market participants. The idea 
of a TGC incentive is that the income received by the renewable generators from 
selling the certificates should cover their additional costs of developing the renewable 
electricity projects compared with the conventional electricity production. If the 
payments exceed the additional cost to a large degree, the overcompensation to the 
generators would be considered as a “windfall profit”. This is because the additional 
payments do not lead to any extra contributions from the generators. The payments do 
not create new incentives.  
As mentioned before, there was 6.5 TWh of the existing generation included into the 
TGC system in 2003. Most of these projects were actually already profitable or almost 
profitable (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2009). This arrangement in fact allowed them to 
obtain an abnormal profit. They could have been financially viable with zero or much 
lower subsidy. 
Furthermore, 12.5 TWh out of the 15 TWh of renewable generation in 2008 was 
generated from plants that already existed before 2003 (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2009). 
The expansion of renewable output in these plants requires lower cost than the 
compensation of the certificate price. The Bergek and Jacobsson (2009) article 
estimates an average cost of expanding these plants at about 40 SEK/MWh based on 
data from 2001. In practice the cost might be substantially higher than this level, but 
these projects are still very likely earning abnormal profit from the TGC market 
considering an average certificate price of more than 200 SEK/MWh. 
That is to say, although the Swedish TGC system has achieved both high renewable 
growth and low cost, there exists an allocation problem in the system. The social 
benefit gained could have been achieved through a lower consumer cost. A substantial 
part of the compensation becomes a source of windfall profit.  
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A key problem of a technology neutral TGC market is that theoretically the certificate 
price will be decided by the marginal cost of the most costly project built to satisfy the 
quota. In case there is a large difference in cost among the various resources promoted, 
the projects with lower cost will receive windfall profit. A technology-differentiated 
system, on the other hand, is less likely to create such problems.  
This problem is closely related to Sweden’s ambition in developing its wind resources 
in the future. The Swedish Parliament has set a national planning framework target for 
the wind power to deliver 30 TWh by 2020, of which 10 TWh would be offshore. 
Under the current system the prerequisite of a significant wind development is a 
sufficiently high quota and the full exploitation of the cheaper resources. At present 
the quota is not sufficiently high to stimulate wind development, so the certificate 
price is low. However, in the future if the two above-mentioned conditions can be 
reached, the large-scale development of wind power will raise the current certificate 
price substantially and lead to further overcompensation to the biomass, hydro and 
CHP projects. Due to the existence of the windfall profit, the Swedish system does not 
perform well in terms of the fairness in allocation. 
Summary 
The Swedish TGC system has established a challenging quota target and obtained 
good compliance record. The cost of compliance has been retained at a reasonable 
level. The system is therefore successful in achieving a political target with a low 
social cost. A good practice in the TGC system is the design of a strict penalty system, 
which guarantees a high compliance level. Besides, the timely enlargement of the 
quota level helps to retain the stability of the TGC market and increase the utilization 
of resources. 
However, the technology neutral design creates an allocation problem among the 
market participants. The system is in fact subsidizing a large amount of projects 
which are economically viable. In the future if more onshore and offshore wind power 
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plants are included in the system, the overcompensation problem will become more 
serious. The current benefit brought by the quota scheme could have been achieved at 
a lower average price for the consumers. 
6.4 Overview of the Norwegian Energy System 
Norway has the second highest electricity consumption per capita in the world. More 
than 50% of the country’s energy consumption is in the form of electricity. 
Hydropower is dominant in Norway’s electricity generation structure. 140 TWh of 
hydropower was produced in 2008, contributing to 98.5% of Norway’s electricity 
production. According to the estimate of the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE, 2009), the total hydropower potential at the end of 2008 was about 
205TWh (Including resources that are already developed and to be exploited). The 
current development has utilized about two thirds of the resources. 
Due to hydropower’s dominance and its advantage as a clean energy source, the 
development of other electricity sources in Norway remains quite low. Wind power, 
for instance, has only very limited deployment in Norway. By the end of 2008 
Norway has installed only 431 MW of wind capacity (Enova, 2010), about 10% of the 
size of the Danish market. The total wind generation in 2009 was 980 GWh, 
consisting of less than 1% of the country’s electricity production.  
6.5 Analysis of Norway’s Objectives  
To analyze whether a common certificate market will be suitable for Norway, it is 
crucial to look at Norway’s objectives in entering such a system. One of the main 
purposes of Norway is to promote its wind power. In spite of the low deployment, 
Norway’s great wind resource potential cannot be ignored. With its long and windy 
coastline Norway has one of the most abundant resources in the world. The average 
wind speed in potential sites can be 7-9 m/s. In 2009 the average capacity of the wind 
sites in Norway was 26%, reflecting a similar resource quality to that in Denmark and 
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the UK. In some good sites the full load hour can achieve 3800 hours, representing a 
very high capacity factor of 43.3% (Enova, 2010). 
At present Norway does not have an operating support system for the wind power, 
and the investment support given by the government is rather limited (Enova, 2010). 
The introduction of the TGC market is expected to break the standstill. 
Small scale hydropower is another renewable source that can be further developed. 
Among the hydro resources that have not yet been developed, there is a potential of 
about 17.9 TWh in small scale sites (NVE, 2009). Developing these sites will involve 
a relatively higher capital cost compared to the existing hydropower projects and 
require a subsidy program. Besides, the renewal of old hydro plants and the 
improvement of their productivity should also be within the policymakers’ objectives. 
Another main concern of the Norwegian regulators is the cost brought by the support 
scheme. Previously there were also proposals for a TGC market, but they were all 
rejected due to a potential high cost to the consumers. The cost concern is also the 
primary reason why the TGC system and the technology neutral design are chosen 
when entering the agreement with Sweden. 
The political factor is also crucial for Norway to adopt a support scheme. In 2009 the 
EU RES Directive decided an objective of reaching 20% share of renewable energy in 
EU’s total energy consumption by 2020. As the directive is EEA-relevant (EEA = 
European Economic Area. Norway is a member country.), it also applies to Norway. 
In order to reach the target set for Norway, the regulators would be willing to choose a 
scheme that can help to reach a target with high degree of certainty and low cost. 
To summarize, the main expectations of the Norwegian regulators to adopt a support 
scheme would be as follows: 
 Stimulating the wind power industry 
 Promoting small scale hydropower and the renewal of old plants 
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 Reaching a political target with high certainty 
 Reaching the target with low social cost 
6.6 Evaluation of the Potential Common Market 
In this section the suitability of a common TGC market for Norway and Sweden is 
analyzed. The discussion is organized in a list of critical issues that may affect the 
realization of Norway’s main objectives. 
The Technology Neutral Design 
The technology neutral design is the most problematic issue in the potential TGC 
program. The original purpose of this design is to achieve the target by the lowest cost 
technology. However, the same as shown in the Swedish case, such a system will not 
discriminate between different sources with different cost and may create an 
allocation problem, compensating a lot the cheapest technologies.  
Under a Sweden-Norway common market, the lowest cost technology is the 
hydropower in Norway. Most of the existing Norwegian hydropower projects are 
already profitable. Even if the system only applies to small scale hydropower (< 1.5 
MW), many projects are still profitable. Although Norway has developed two thirds 
of its hydro resources, there is still a potential of about 60-80 TWh that can be 
exploited. It is highly possible to develop some profitable projects among these 
remaining resources. Part of the subsidies given to these projects will create abnormal 
profits. 
The Swedish biomass generation and biomass-based CHP, in general, may have the 
second lowest cost. Some biomass generators are also close to being financially 
competitive. For those biomass-fueled plants that really require subsidies, the new 
system may seriously affect their operation in case that the total quota is not 
sufficiently high. Previously they could get compensation from the Swedish TGC 
system; under the new system, with the Norwegian hydropower plants possibly 
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bringing down the certificate price, they may encounter losses in operation. 
The wind power plants have the highest cost among these three most promising 
sources. Theoretically the investors will concentrate on the lowest cost technology 
until they are exhausted. The Norwegian wind power industry can benefit from the 
scheme only when the quota is set sufficiently high. However, even if the target can 
stimulate some wind growth, it will lead to the same problem that has been discussed 
in the Swedish system. The certificate price will be raised to a level high enough to 
support the wind power growth, but the other cheaper sources are thus 
over-compensated. This problem is almost inevitable under a technology neutral TGC 
system.  
There could however be one exception. As the electricity price varies geographically, 
wind power may become competitive in the system in those regions where the 
electricity prices are very high. With a high electricity price the wind projects do not 
necessarily need a high certificate price. This has been observed in the Texas case 
where the wholesale electricity price is high (due to the high natural gas price) and 
therefore the subsidy level can be lower. 
In conclusion, a technology neutral system is not suitable for Norway if developing a 
large amount of wind resources is indeed one of the main objectives of the 
policymakers. It is ineffective in stimulating Norway’s wind resources and will cause 
over-compensation problems. In practice as the resources used for compliance 
(hydropower and biomass) have low cost, the certificate price may be low. But 
windfall profit may still exist in firms using these resources.  
Differentiating Resources 
Even if the TGC scheme is not technology neutral, it still has difficulty in properly 
differentiating resources, as discussed in the previous chapter. Granting more 
certificates to expensive technologies (the UK case) is not very efficient as it is 
difficult to decide the exact amount to be granted. Still it will commonly lead to 
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over-compensation or lack of compensation. Setting individual quotas for different 
technologies (the Texas case) may be a better solution, but it will require establishing 
several certificate markets and thus increase the complexity, both for the regulators 
and the mandated parties. 
Target Compliance 
A TGC market should enable Norway to fulfill its environmental obligations with 
high degree of certainty. Given the cheap and abundant hydro and biomass resources 
in Norway and Sweden, as well as the good compliance record in Sweden, it can be 
expected that the future common market will also perform well in meeting the quota. 
A strict incompliance penalty will help to achieve this objective. 
Utilization of Wind Resources 
In addition to the technology neutral design, the TGC system itself is less effective in 
promoting wind resources than the feed-in system. Its higher uncertainty will lead to a 
greater capital cost to the wind projects. Projects with lower upfront investment and 
higher variable cost more likely benefit from it. The lower upfront cost leaves the 
investors more flexibility over the project life cycle. The variable cost can be 
compensated immediately when the certificates are generated so the cost better 
matches with the revenue stream. Even if the Norwegian wind projects can reach a 
similar cost as the Swedish biomass projects, investors may still prefer the latter 
because of the higher flexibility and lower risk level. 
Cross-country Subsidy 
Another controversial topic of a common TGC market between Norway and Sweden 
is the cross-country subsidy issue. Norway and Sweden both have obligations in the 
Kyoto Protocol and EU Emission Trading System (ETS). A key question is whether 
one country’s subsidy should support another country in meeting its climate change 
obligation? There should be a proper arrangement to make it fair for both parties.  
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A possible solution may be to set a common climate obligation for the two countries 
in the future international agreements. However, this will also be challenging as both 
countries still have their local support policies in addition to the TGC scheme. It will 
still be difficult to distinguish their respective financial contributions to the common 
obligation.  
The interaction of local support policies and the TGC scheme will also be a 
potentially problematic area. The Texas case has shown how significantly the policies 
(PTC and RPS) interact with each other. The TGC system will support the technology 
with cost advantage. A cross-country TGC may give local authorities incentives to 
further subsidize the local plants, in order to make those plants cost-competitive and 
thus eligible for the certificates. For instance, the biomass plants in Norway have a 
higher average cost than those in Sweden. But assuming that there is a local 
investment support in Norway for biomass plants, they will require less compensation 
from the TGC market. Therefore they will win the competition against the Swedish 
plants and get the subsidy. This situation is unfair but can hardly be completely 
avoided. 
Political Pressure on Quota Setting 
Setting a proper quota is the most crucial issue in the successful design of a TGC 
system. It requires a careful evaluation of the country’s resource potential and the cost 
structure of the promoted technologies. Political factors may become influential when 
a common quota is to be agreed by two countries. In most cases it will be the political 
pressure that makes the two countries compromise and set up compatible targets, 
instead of a scientific measurement of the countries’ own situation. For instance, a 
recent presentation by Statnett (Austang, 2010) estimated the quota of the common 
TGC market. They estimated that in order for Sweden to meet its 2020 target of 
adding 25 TWh additional renewable generation from 2002 to 2020, it needs to 
increase 13 TWh from 2012 to 2020. Based on this Norway has to contribute also 13 
TWh to the scheme, so in total the quota would be adding 26 TWh from 2012 to 
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2020.  
Such an estimate is arbitrary. Norway and Sweden have very different resource types 
and potentials. It is not reasonable to simply require the two countries to have the 
same target. In addition, in a TGC system the common target is set for both countries 
and it is impossible to expect the two countries to get the same level of development. 
The common target should be set up according to both countries’ resources situation. 
Summary 
The TGC market will help Norway in meeting some of its objectives. More 
hydropower resources can be utilized in Norway, and the old plants can get incentives 
to renew and increase the output. These projects will not require a substantial 
investment but can bring high environmental returns. Besides the TGC scheme can 
ensure Norway in fulfilling its environmental obligations under international 
agreements.  
However, the technology neutral design should be revised in order to prevent the 
system from becoming a windfall profit generator. The current system will enable 
many hydropower and biomass plants to get abnormal profit, and thus make it unfair 
for the consumers.  
The system also cannot satisfy the objective of developing the wind resources 
efficiently. In the short term all the certificates will probably be occupied by hydro 
and biomass projects; in the long run if wind power is used for compliance, the 
certificate price will be substantially raised and greatly overcompensate the lower cost 
projects. The difficulty is further compounded by the fact that a TGC system will 
involve high uncertainty for the wind developers. 
A cross-country scheme and the interaction from local policies will further increase 
the complexity. It is difficult to ensure that the two countries get similar benefits from 
the system. Political factors may also affect the outcome of the system. 
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6.7 Policy Suggestions 
In the last section some policy suggestions is made for the Norwegian regulators in 
promoting Norway’s renewable resources. As the details of the TGC scheme have not 
come out, the suggestions can only concentrate on some general policy design 
aspects. 
Will a FIT better fit Norway? 
In many aspects, a FIT scheme may be more suitable to achieve Norway’s objectives. 
Separate FITs can be set to promote the small scale hydropower, wind power and 
biomass resources. The advantage of the FIT in promoting high capital cost 
technologies has been elaborated in the previous chapters. It can effectively stimulate 
the deployment of Norway’s wind resources. If the Norwegian regulators do not want 
to impose too much financial pressure on the consumers, the FIT for wind power can 
be set relatively lower, so only those sites with the best resource quality will be 
developed. 
The tariff levels for different technologies can be strictly controlled according to their 
cost so there will not be a high level of overcompensation to the plants. In this sense, 
compared to a technology neutral TGC the FIT can ensure a better allocation of the 
benefits and costs among the market participants, which would better fit Norway’s 
objective. But it is important to note that finding the correct level of a FIT is also 
difficult.  
Another option for Norway is the feed-in premium system used in Denmark. It has the 
same advantages as a FIT, but is more market-based. Under the premium system the 
generators will adjust to the market demand, which better facilitates the integration of 
renewable electricity into the network. The Norwegian small-scaled hydropower 
market, for instance, has been quite mature and will be suitable for the premium 
system. The wind power market, on the other hand, is still immature and a FIT can 
help to reduce the investment risk. 
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How to improve a TGC scheme? 
As Norway has entered an agreement with Sweden, the common TGC scheme is very 
likely to be implemented. There are some suggestions to improve the operations of the 
system.  
Differentiating Technologies: The technology neutral system, as discussed before, 
will very likely create windfall profit for plants with low cost. The Swedish 
experience has proved this. A differentiated quota system can be considered as a better 
alternative. Like what have been done in Texas, separate quotas can be set for 
hydropower, wind and biomass. It has to be ensured that all the systems have 
mandated power and the targets are designed after careful measurement. Several 
parallel quota schemes may seem complicated for the retailers, but it is the best way 
to ensure that all the technologies get promoted with the least social cost involved. 
This system will be effective in achieving the four main objectives of the Norwegian 
regulators.  
Eligibility Standard: One controversial issue in the Swedish TGC system is that it 
allowed 6.5 TWh of existing generation to be entitled to certificates when the system 
started operation. Most of these firms were already profitable and became 
overcompensated. In the new common system this problem can be alleviated through 
a well-designed access standard for the renewable generators. Setting an eligibility 
restriction on projects with different scales is important. The green certificates should 
not be granted to those projects that already very profitable without a TGC subsidy. 
For instance, the Texas system has a restriction on the size of the hydro projects, 
counting only those less than 25MW. This issue is particularly important in the 
Norwegian system in which hydropower is expected to take a dominant position. 
Setting such a limit is important but difficult. Generally small-scale hydropower 
projects tend to be more expensive than the larger ones, but it also depends on the 
conditions of different sites. The limit setting should carefully consider the average 
costs of the projects with different sizes. The main purpose here is to ensure most of 
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the subsidy is collected by those projects that are really in need of support. 
Strict Penalty: The high compliance rate in Sweden should be attributed to the strict 
penalty system. An ineffective punishment system will cause a low compliance rate 
and a high certificate price, as shown in the UK case. The Norwegian-Swedish 
common TGC market can consider using the same system as the Swedish one. 
Policy Interactions: Interactions of the TGC market and the local policies adopted by 
the two countries should be carefully evaluated. Other support policies should be 
approved by the two regulators together, in order to avoid causing market distortion of 
the TGC market. Signals of destructive competition, such as local policies subsidizing 
local plants to make them more competitive in the TGC market, should be examined 
every year. 
Target Setting: Overall speaking, the quota setting should be based on evaluation of 
the society’s needs and the external effects, in order to decide what would be a 
reasonable cost of implementing the mechanism. The main purpose is to achieve the 
best solution for society (also in the long run) at minimum cost, including those cost 
that is difficult to reflect in an unregulated market.  
If a technology-differentiated market is applied in the future common market, 
separated targets should be set for wind, hydropower and biomass. The targets should 
both reflect the resource potential and the regulators’ ambition at developing that 
resource. If a technology neutral system is used, it should be noted that a big quota 
may lead to overcompensation to lower cost generators and high consumer costs. This 
is because if wind power is used to satisfy the quota, the certificate price will rise 
substantially and the hydropower and biomass plants will likely be over-compensated. 
A solution here may be to charge a special resource tax to the plants earning windfall 
profit, but the resulting system complexity may therefore become an issue.  
Target Updates: The Swedish quota scheme has been updated twice since it started 
in 2003. The timely adjustment of the target ensured the stability of the market and 
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provided confidence to the investors. A delay in target update may restrict the 
potential of the market from developing further.  
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7. Conclusion 
For renewable energy to get further promoted and achieve its full potential of 
reducing the environmental impacts brought by energy consumption, it is essential to 
establish suitable support mechanisms which provide a stable environment for the 
development of the renewable projects, with a high increase in capacity construction 
and power generation, and a reduction in cost.  
This thesis discusses this topic and studies the cases of the adoption of two major 
support frameworks – feed-in tariffs and green certificates, in four major wind power 
markets. From the case studies it could be concluded that the feed-in system, or the 
pricing approach, has been more effective than the TGC system, or the quota 
approach, in stimulating more installations and generation. The FIT can create a 
securer investment environment and therefore limit the risk borne by the project 
developers. Due to the straightforward setting of the FIT for the investors (giving 
subsidy for every unit of generation), it is thus more flexible to differentiate subsidy 
levels to renewable projects with different cost levels. In this sense it helps to utilize a 
country’s renewable resources to the greatest extent and promote the diversity of 
renewable sources. 
The TGC system has more concern on the cost perspective. Given a good system it is 
possible to achieve the lowest cost in remunerating the renewable projects. Also it is a 
more market-based approach, which requires the generators to act towards the 
demand of the market and thus facilitates the network integration. However, the 
extent to which the renewable sources would be promoted depends on the ambition of 
the policymakers. If only a conservative goal is set up, the development of the 
country’s resources would be limited.  
Considering these characteristics the choice of schemes depends largely on the policy 
objectives. If the goal of the policymaker is to maximize the renewable development 
within a reasonable cost level, the feed-in system is more suitable. If the objective is 
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to reach a political goal to increase the green electricity generation to a certain level, 
and have more control on the total financial input used for the subsidy, the certificate 
market suits better.  
The thesis also evaluates the prospect of the cooperation of Norway and Sweden to 
establish a common green certificate market. The analysis shows that although the 
Swedish TGC market has a good compliance record and relatively low cost, the 
system has performed poorly in the allocation of cost and benefits among different 
market actors. The problem lies in the technology neutral design and the decision to 
include already existing plants into the quota scheme, which results in over-subsidy 
on some firms which have lower generation cost. 
A common TGC market can help Norway in exploiting its abundant renewable 
resources, especially the wind and small-scale hydropower sources. However, in order 
to avoid generating a large amount of windfall profit like what has happened in 
Sweden, it is suggested that the technology neutral design should not be adopted. The 
current system design agreed by the two governments will enable many hydropower 
and biomass plants to get abnormal profit. In addition the tech-neutral design may be 
less effective to support the wind power projects in Norway (depending on the cost of 
the different eligible technologies and the quota size), while this was claimed to be an 
important objective by the policymakers. Another aspect that can be improved is to 
establish a high eligibility standard. It is important to decide whether to include the 
existing firms into the system, and which types of the projects should be eligible. A 
careful market design is essential when adopting a green certificate scheme, in order 
to prevent possible market failure or market inefficiency. 
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